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i

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof […]”
– The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment to the Constitution

“Tell us therefore, What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Caesar, or not?
But Jesus perceived their wickedness, and said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites?
Shew me the tribute money. And they brought unto him a penny.
And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription?
They say unto him, Caesar's. Then saith he unto them, Render therefore unto Caesar the
things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's.
When they had heard these words, they marvelled, and left him, and went their way.”
-Matthew 22: 17-22

ii

ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a comprehensive history of Supreme Court Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence from 1879 until the present day. It describes how a jurisdictional approach
to free exercise dominated the Court’s rulings from its first Free Exercise Clause case in
1879 until Sherbert v. Verner in 1963, and how Sherbert introduced an accommodationist
precedent which was ineffectively, incompletely, and inconsistently defined by the Court.
This thesis shows how proponents of accommodationism furthered a false narrative
overstating the scope and consistency of Sherbert’s precedent following the Court’s
repudiation of accommodationism and return to full jurisdictionalism with Employment
Division v. Smith (1990). It then shows how this narrative inspired a massive bipartisan
coalition in favor of codifying accommodationism, and how this coalition succeeded in
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993. The RFRA coalition
eventually fractured, as RFRA’s implications began to conflict with principles and
objectives of liberal interest groups and the Democratic Party. This thesis posits that the
fracture of the RFRA coalition can be traced back directly to confusions over Sherbert’s
precedent.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 1993, Congressman Charles Schumer (D-NY-9) introduced the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to the floor of the Senate.1 Both Schumer
and RFRA had auspicious futures ahead. RFRA received remarkably broad support from
interest groups left and right, religious and secular, and would pass the House and Senate
by 435-0 and 97-3 margins, respectively. On November 16, 1993, President Bill Clinton
signed RFRA into law. Congressman Schumer became Senator Schumer in 1999, after
serving nine full terms in the House. Following Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid’s (DNV) retirement in November 2016, Senator Schumer became leader of the Senate
Democratic Caucus.
But today, Minority Leader Schumer opposes his own bill. Schumer’s political
positions have not changed appreciably, and neither have RFRA’s contents; other than no
longer applying to the states, the current RFRA is verbatim from the bill that Schumer
introduced in 1993. It still stipulates that a government regulation may “substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion” only if the regulation is both “in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” And yet, while Democrats overwhelmingly supported
RFRA in 1993, today they, like their Senate leader, oppose RFRA by a similarly huge
margin. Liberal interest groups, too, now oppose RFRA: most notably the American Civil
Liberties Union, which prominently supported RFRA in 1993.2
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H.R. 1308, 103rd Cong. (1993).
Melling, Louise. "ACLU: Why we can no longer support the federal ‘religious freedom’ law." The
Washington Post, June 25, 2015.
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The impetus for the left wing’s shift from support of RFRA to opposition was the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores.3 In a decision reviled by the
vast majority of Democrats, the Hobby Lobby Court interpreted RFRA’s “person”
requirement as including closely held for-profit corporations with religious mission
statements. Less than a month after Hobby Lobby, Senator Schumer spoke about RFRA
and Hobby Lobby on the Senate floor:
“As the author of the bill, I can say again with absolute certainty that the Supreme
Court got the Hobby Lobby case dead wrong. When we wrote RFRA back in
1993, we did so to protect that which individuals with strong religious beliefs had
always enjoyed—the presumption that they should be able to exercise their
religious beliefs without interference from the government. But the Court took
that protection and misapplied it to for-profit companies that exist for the purpose
of benefiting from the open market.”4
Today, Democrats and liberal interest groups almost unanimously oppose RFRA as
currently interpreted by the Court. But while Hobby Lobby was the obvious catalyst of
this outright opposition, I would, and do, argue that the seeds of this opposition were laid
decades earlier. I argue that the left-wing opposition to RFRA and similar religious
accommodations bills actually began in the mid-1990’s, and that even that opposition can
be directly traced back to confusion over the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause during the years spanning Sherbert v. Verner in 1963 to Employment
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. ___ (2014).
Senator Schumer, speaking on S. 2578, 133th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 160 (July 16,
2014): S 4531.
4

2

Division v. Smith in 1990.5 I argue that the Court insufficiently explained its reasoning for
applying the strict scrutiny standard to free exercise accommodations claims—the very
same standard that RFRA would later codify into statute. Consequently, there was an
implicit tension between the two different interpretations of free exercise
accommodationism: a tension that finally came to the political forefront after Hobby
Lobby, over half a century after its genesis.
Even more than a legal analysis, this thesis is a history, and it covers nearly 150
years of free exercise jurisprudence. First, in Chapters Two and Three, it will look at the
Supreme Court’s free exercise case law leading up to RFRA’s passage. In Court case law,
the jurisdictional approach to the Free Exercise Clause dominated the period from
Reynolds v. United States (1879), the Court’s first free exercise case, until Sherbert in
1963. For these 84 years, neutral laws were universally upheld, and only discrimination
or hybrid claims with another constitutional protection were granted. Sherbert v. Verner
(1963) started a new era of 27 years, detailed in Chapter Three, in which
accommodationism was largely accepted.
In a sense, the story of the Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is largely
the story of competition between these two perspectives. The jurisdictional view of free
exercise posits that, because there are proper spheres for the state to regulate secular
activity, its laws are valid and must be complied with so long as the state is regulating

5

Sherbert v. Verner, 376 U.S. 398 (1963); Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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those secular activities without targeting religious belief or religious practice as such.6
Accommodationists, in contrast, contend that even indirect burdens from perfectly valid
laws can unconstitutionally infringe upon religious liberty, as the Free Exercise Clause
protects the right to practice religion even against neutral and constitutional laws. When
religious practice conflicts with a law’s requirements, and exemptions are not granted to
those whose religious practices are affected, accommodationists place the burden of proof
on the government, and require the state to provide justification for why it cannot provide
an exemption from the law.7
One oversimplified conception of the two competing views is that
jurisdictionalists see free exercise as a negative right, with the state prohibited from
infringing upon the right to religious practice, while accommodationists see free exercise
as a positive right, meaning the state is obligated to accommodate religious practice. The
structure of the First Amendment would support the negative rights view, as the
Amendment says that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” rather than making positive guarantees
of liberty.8 This view may not be entirely fair to accommodationists, however, as they
consider themselves to only require government action to remedy previous government
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For examples of the jurisdictional perspective, see Marshall, William P. "In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism," University of Chicago Law Review: 58: Iss. 1 (1991); Muñoz, Vincent Phillip.
"Two Concepts of Religious Liberty: The Natural Rights and Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free
Exercise of Religion." American Political Science Review 110, no. 2 (May 2016).
7
For examples of the accommodationist perspective see Laycock, Douglas. "The Remnants of Free
Exercise." The Supreme Court Review 1990 (1990); McConnell, Michael W. "Free Exercise Revisionism
and the Smith Decision." University of Chicago Law Review 57 (1990).
8
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
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action; in contrast to, for example, the positive right to counsel found in the Sixth
Amendment.9
There is a lively debate over the original intent of the Free Exercise Clause. Many
well regarded scholars, such as Michael McConnell, have argued that accommodationism
was the common practice at the time of the founding, while others, such as Vincent
Phillip Muñoz, have argued that the framers intended the Free Exercise Clause to be
jurisdictionalist in nature.10 In general, while I am convinced by McConnell that religious
exemptions from neutral laws were prevalent before, during, and shortly after the
founding, I am further convinced by arguments from others that, while religious
accommodations were present in statutes, they were never considered constitutionally
required until the 20th century. These originalist debates are important, and have a role in
national discussions on the proper ways to ensure the First Amendment’s guarantee of
religious liberty. They have even made their way into Court opinions: see, for example,
Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia’s warring opinions in Boerne v. Flores (1997).11 But
these debates are beyond the scope of this thesis, which concerns itself only with the free
exercise decisions of the Supreme Court and the impact those decisions have had on each
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See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Of course, even the right to counsel can be framed as a
negative right; the Sixth Amendment protects citizens from being jailed without a fair trial, and an attorney
can be seen as nothing more than a necessary means to that end. For an in-depth comparison of positive and
negative rights in American constitutional law, see Currie, David P. "Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights," University of Chicago Law Review 53 (1986).
10
See McConnell, Michael W. "The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion." Harvard Law Review 103, no. 7 (1990); Muñoz, Vincent Phillip. "The Original Meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress." Harvard Journal of Law and Public
Policy 31, no. 3 (2008); Muñoz, Vincent Phillip.
11
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Justice Scalia’s opinion at 537, Justice O’Connor’s
opinion at 544.
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other and on current public policy. The intentions of the framers are ambiguous, but
Court opinions are binary. They have a winner and a loser, and have the force of law and
precedent. This is not to say that these opinions are pellucid, or even consistent; indeed,
one of the main points of my thesis is that the Court’s ambiguity and inconsistency when
applying strict scrutiny to free exercise claims led to the confusion which fractured the
bipartisan RFRA coalition. As decisions they are flawed, but nevertheless they serve as
judicial precedent, and so form the backbone of my thesis.
From Sherbert in 1963 until Smith in 1990, the jurisdictional and
accommodationist positions were in constant tension on the Court. Sherbert established a
new, accommodationist standard for evaluating free exercise claims for exemptions.12
This standard became known as the Sherbert Test or the Compelling Interest Test. During
the period of 1963-1990, the Court usually accepted the Sherbert Test, and therefore, to
at least some extent, the accommodationist position. But while justices usually agreed in
theory on accepting Sherbert’s precedent, they interpreted the Sherbert Test differently,
disagreeing on its scope and application and often declining to apply it at all.
At the root of this confusion was an unspoken confusion within the
accommodationist camp. The Sherbert Test was closely based on strict scrutiny, a
heightened standard of review established by the Court in United States v. Carolene
Products (1938).13 The strict scrutiny test assumes unconstitutional all statutes that fall
into at least one of three groups: laws abridging fundamental rights, laws infringing upon

12

For purposes of this thesis, the Sherbert Test, the compelling interest test, and strict scrutiny can be
considered identical and interchangeable unless otherwise specified.
13
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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the democratic political process, or the laws affecting “discrete and insular minorities.” In
Sherbert and in following cases, the Court never explicitly said why it was applying strict
scrutiny (in the form of the Sherbert Test). Much of the Court’s language suggests that it
is applied as a protection for discrete and insular minorities. So does the record of the
test’s beneficiaries: the Court never applied the Sherbert Test to a claim from a mainline
Christian before RFRA.
Not all saw the Sherbert Test as applying only to religious minorities, however;
there was a competing but similarly unarticulated strain of thought that a holder of any
religious belief, no matter how popular, politically powerful or integrated into society,
would be entitled to an exemption from a valid and neutral law if said law failed the
Sherbert Test against the claim. These right-wing accommodationists have a less
contextualized conception of the Free Exercise Clause, and see free exercise as a
monolithic, positive right to act in a religiously motivated manner so long as the
government does not have a compelling interest in curtailing said action.
I have decided to call these two interpretations of free exercise
accommodationism left-wing accommodationism and right-wing accommodationism.
Left-wing accommodationists hold the minority protections view: that the purpose of free
exercise exemptions is to protect discrete and insular religious minorities that are often
disadvantaged by the political process. Right-wing accommodationists hold the
fundamental rights view that free exercise is a positive right to action regardless of the
political process.

7

This is not to say that all members on the political left hold the minority
protections view of free exercise, or that all members of the political right hold the
positive fundamental rights view of free exercise. For elected officials and interest
groups, however, this tends to almost always be the case. Particularly now, in an era of
heightened polarization, nearly all Democrats in Congress hold the minority rights view,
and nearly all Republicans hold the fundamental rights view. Current party platforms
reflect these differences: the 2016 Democratic Party Platform has a whole section on
religious minorities, and proclaims that “We support a progressive vision of religious
freedom that respects pluralism and rejects the misuse of religion to discriminate.”14 The
2016 Republican Party Platform makes more generalized statements about free exercise,
such as that “[r]eligious freedom in the Bill of Rights protects the right of the people to
practice their faith in their everyday lives,” while also including pro-Hobby Lobby
language like “[w]e support the right of the people to conduct their businesses in
accordance with their religious beliefs.”15
Scholars, however, have a more eclectic mix of views, that cannot neatly fit on an
ideological spectrum. Michael McConnell, a prominent conservative appointed to a
judgeship by President George W. Bush, speaks in favor of accommodationism largely
because of its protections for religious minorities. Douglas Laycock is left of center on
many issues, for example supporting gay marriage prior to Obergefell, but nevertheless
promotes a right-wing accommodationist view that endorses Hobby Lobby and the more
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2016 Democratic Party Platform. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/117717.pdf, at 47, 19.
Republican Platform 2016. https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]ben_1468872234.pdf, at 11, 12.
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sweeping state RFRAs. Meanwhile, scholars from across the ideological spectrum, from
Marci Hamilton on the left to Vincent Phillip Muñoz on the right, have rejected
accommodationism entirely, in favor of a jurisdictional view. Regardless, the minority
protections view has correlated nearly perfectly with the positions of liberal interest
groups and politicians, while the fundamental rights view has correlated nearly perfectly
with conservative interest groups and politicians, so the left-wing/ right-wing distinction
has some merit beyond its brevity.
These two camps—the left-wing accommodationists, basing their exemptions
claims on minority rights, and the right-wing accommodationists, basing their claim on a
universal, fundamental right to exemptions from indirect burdens—stayed united in their
cause during the decades after Sherbert, as the tension on the Court was between
jurisdictionalists and all accommodationists in general. There was never occasion for the
camps to split on a Court case, as each and every one of the Court’s free exercise
accommodationism cases before 1990 concerned minority religious practices.
Employment Division v. Smith (1990) changed everything. It was a pyrrhic victory
for jurisdictionalism, temporarily reinstating the rule that the Free Exercise Clause does
not mandate any exemptions from indirect burdens caused by secular and neutral laws,
neutrally applied. Smith became wildly unpopular, however, as its opponents promoted
an erroneous but remarkably successful narrative that accommodationism had been the
normal interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause throughout the nation’s history. In
response to Smith, Congress drafted a law which codified strict scrutiny Sherbert Test
protections for all free exercise accommodations claims against state, local and federal

9

laws. This law, RFRA, received overwhelming bipartisan support, as mentioned earlier
and detailed in Chapter Four. Interest groups from across the political spectrum
advocated for its passage, including left-wing interest groups like the ACLU and People
for the American Way, right-wing interest groups like Coalitions for America and The
Rutherford Institute, and 51 religious organizations from a broad swath of denominations:
Mainline Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Native American Church and more.
Remarkably, the final RFRA bill passed through the House 435-0, without even a single
abstention. RFRA then passed the Senate 97-3, with the only objections coming from
conservative Senators who agreed with the bill in principle.
Chapter Five begins with Boerne v. Flores (1997), in which the Court found
RFRA an overreach of congressional authority and struck it down as applied to the
states.16 While RFRA still applied to federal law, Congress struggled to find an
alternative means to apply strict scrutiny to state and local free exercise claims in the late
1990’s. Complicating this quest were the burgeoning tensions between left-wing
accommodationists and right-wing accommodationists, as the differing ideals of the two
camps conflicted in practice for the first time. Religious claims were beginning to be used
against other minority groups, most frequently in the form of religious landlords
objecting to gay tenants. The nature and standards of the new RFRA replacements being
proposed were no different: they codified the same version of the Sherbert Test that
RFRA had. But, as shown in Chapters Five and Six, it was now becoming clear that
RFRA and the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence were not one and the same. Mainline

16

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Protestants’ RFRA claims succeeded more frequently than those of religious minorities,
and new claims, such as landlords objecting to their tenants’ practices, were sprouting up
every month. The ACLU opposed the state-applicable RFRA replacement, and
Democrats were skeptical, so the bill was dropped in favor of a more limited,
compromise solution: the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), which applied only to land use regulations and prison inmates. Several states
took action to pass their own RFRA’s, which mirrored the federal RFRA in form. Free
exercise accommodationism became less of a national concern, as the few free exercise
bills that were introduced were low priority and died in, or even before, committee.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014), the Court ruled that for-profit
corporations were capable of free exercise and therefore were covered by RFRA’s
protections, a holding which forced the tensions between left-wing accommodationists
and right-wing accommodationists to the surface. Hobby Lobby’s claim was foreign to a
left-wing accommodationist’s view of the Free Exercise Clause for two main reasons:
first, the owners of Hobby Lobby’s stated values were Protestant, and therefore not of a
discrete and insular minority, and second, Hobby Lobby was a corporation, and therefore
ineligible for religious protections. Jurisdictionalists had a third, additional qualm with
the ruling, as the law from which Hobby Lobby was exempted was valid, neutral and
generally applicable. Hobby Lobby was consistent with right-wing accommodationism,
however, as right-wing accommodationism holds a fundamental rights view of free
exercise with claims contingent on time, place and manner of the state’s burden rather
than individualized personal context.

11

Following Hobby Lobby, Republicans began, for the first time, carving out free
exercise exemptions for specific beliefs, rather than creating a general test that applies to
all religious claims against all government policies. Today, free exercise
accommodationism has become partisan and highly polarized, with most Democrats and
left-wing accommodationists denouncing RFRA as it is currently interpreted. Free
exercise accommodations are more of a broad national policy issue than they have ever
been, and show no signs of getting less controversial in the foreseeable future. Therefore,
it is critically important to understand the basis of free exercise accommodationism, and
the legal reasoning for, and against, its implementation. This thesis will attempt to
complement such essential discourse.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE JURISDICTIONAL ERA, 1879-1963
For the first century and a half of government under the Constitution, what would
later be known as the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment stayed out of the
limelight of Supreme Court jurisprudence.17 Indeed, the Free Exercise Clause itself was
scarcely mentioned until the 1950’s, as the Court did not distinguish the Free Exercise
and Establishment clauses from each other, or often even from the other provisions of the
First Amendment, until the 1940’s and 1950’s.18 The defining religious liberty case of the
era was Reynolds v. United States (1879),19 in which the Court heard the case of George
Reynolds, a member of the Church of Latter-Day Saints living in the federal territory of
Utah. Reynolds had been convicted, fined and sentenced to hard labor for practicing
polygamy, a practice which he claimed was religiously mandated and therefore protected
by the religious provisions of the First Amendment. Chief Justice Morrison Waite,
writing for a unanimous Court, rejected Reynolds’s claim, and in doing so established a
jurisdictionalist “belief/conduct barrier” that would stand as precedent for 61 years. The
barrier established the doctrine that, while the Federal Government could not regulate
religious belief, it had legitimate authority to regulate conduct: “[l]aws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices.” 20 The Reynolds Court held that the First
Amendment’s true guarantee of religious liberty was to prevent the Federal Government
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At this time, the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses were not seen as separable (see pages 16-17).
Muñoz, Vincent Phillip. Religious Liberty and the American Supreme Court. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2015. at xiii.
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Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
20
Ibid, at 166.
18
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from intruding into private beliefs or outlawing religious minorities. Any further
protections would prove impossible to apply in practice, as there was such a plethora of
religious doctrines that few laws could be universally applied without exemptions. The
Court rejected outright the notion that religious exemptions could be required, as “[t]o
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.”21
The Court’s opinion did, however, leave some indication that Congress could not
target a religious practice because of its religious nature itself, but only because of its
effect on secular civil society. It spent significant effort proving that Western societies
had viewed polygamy as “an offense to society,” since the “earliest history of England,”
going back to common law practice under King James I.22 Such historical background
would not be necessary if the Court had permitted Congress to regulate all religious
conduct. One could plausibly read this portion of the opinion as a tacit admission that
such regulation would not be permissible if the primary motive for the legislation were
animus towards a religious group.
Reynolds remained the sole landmark religious liberty case, and controlling
precedent, until Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940).23 Cantwell proved critical for two
reasons. First, Cantwell “incorporated” the religious provisions of the First Amendment
through the liberty provision of the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, meaning that

21

Ibid, at 167.
Ibid, at 164-166.
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Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
22
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state and local governments would now be held to the same standards as the Federal
Government for religious liberty claims. Second, the Cantwell Court unanimously
overturned the jurisdictional belief/conduct barrier that had been accepted since
Reynolds, ruling that “the [First] Amendment embraces two concepts—freedom to
believe and freedom to act.”24 While the Court provided no clear standard for evaluating
what constitutes a violation of the right to religious action, it voided the Connecticut law
because the statute in question required state actors to make judgements on the validity of
religious beliefs. The statute prohibited persons from soliciting money or subscriptions
for any religious or philanthropic cause before receiving a certificate from a state official.
This gave state officials discretion over which alleged religious beliefs were valid, a point
which the Court found violated the First Amendment, as incorporated through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “[the state actor] is authorized to withhold
his approval if he determines that the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of
religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by
the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the
Fourteenth.”25 Thus, the only bright line test established by Cantwell was that the
government could not place itself in the position of deciding what is or is not a valid
religious belief.
While Cantwell set critical free exercise precedent, it is important to remember
that it is not only a religious liberty case: in some ways, it is just as much a free speech
case. The Court held “that defendant's conviction of the common law offense of breach of

24
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Ibid, at 303.
Ibid, at 305.
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the peace was violative of constitutional guarantees of religious liberty and freedom of
speech.”26 Since Near v. Minnesota (1931), the Court had ruled that censorship of speech
before publication, known as prior restraint or previous restraint, violated the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment.27 In some cases, such as Near, licensing requirements
were found to qualify as prior restraint. Cantwell is such a case, as “the availability of a
judicial remedy for abuses in the system of licensing still leaves that system one of
previous restraint which, in the field of free speech and press, we have held
inadmissible.”28
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) and Follett v. Town of McCormick (1944), the
Court gave its first indication that a neutral law, neutrally applied could violate the First
Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty: the first crack in the jurisdictional wall. 29 In
both Murdock and Follett, city ordinances required door-to-door salesmen to purchase a
vending license before soliciting from the public. In these cases, as in Cantwell, the
petitioners were Jehovah’s Witnesses who believed evangelizing to be a religious
obligation. The Court, by a 5-4 margin in Murdock and a 6-3 margin in Follett, found
these licenses to be an undue burden on religious practice,30 because “distribution of

26

Ibid, at 299.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
28
Cantwell, at 306.
29
Murdock v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeannette), 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Follett v. Town of McCormick, South
Carolina, 321 U.S. 73 (1944).
30
These decisions departed from the Court’s opinion, just one year prior, in the consolidated cases of Jones
v. Opelika; Bowden v. Fort Smith; Jobin v. Arizona, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), where the court ruled 5-4 that
such licensing fees were permissible: “[w]hen proponents of religious or social theories use the ordinary
commercial methods of sales of article to raise propaganda funds, it is a natural and proper exercise of the
power of the State to charge reasonable fees for the privilege of canvasing.” (J. Reed, opinion of the Court,
at 597.)
27
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religious literature in return for money when done as a method of spreading the
distributor's religious beliefs is an exercise of religion within the First Amendment and
therefore immune from interference by the requirement of a license.”31 For the first time,
the Court hinted at accepting the accommodationist position that a religiously motivated
action had more inherent constitutional protection than an act motivated by secular
ideology and motivations.
But again, as in Cantwell, there were secular aspects to Murdock and Follett.
Since Cantwell, the Court had ruled in Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942) that regulations
of commercial speech be subject to lesser scrutiny than regulations of other speech.32
Therefore, conflation of commercial speech with religious speech (with noncommercial
purpose) was a free speech issue even aside from the religious elements of the cases. The
Court says as much; in Murdock, it finds the challenged ordinance “invalid under the
Federal Constitution as a denial of freedom of speech, press and religion.”33 The
jurisdictional view of religious liberty still dominated; no neutral law, neutrally applied
had yet been found unconstitutional on purely religious grounds.
In the decades following Follett, the Court transitioned from its conception of a
general guarantee of religious liberty under the First Amendment to separate and distinct
conceptions of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.34 While the
previously mentioned cases tended towards a general conception of “religious liberty,” by
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Follett, at 578 (J. Reed, concurring in judgment.)
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
33
Murdock, at 105.
34
Muñoz (2015), at xiii.
32
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McGowan v. Maryland (1961), justices spoke of their distinct “reading[s] of the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.”35 In Braunfeld v. Braun (1961), for
example, Justice William Brennan wrote in dissent that while “there is no merit in
appellants’ establishment and equal-protection claims [there is] as to the claim that
Pennsylvania has prohibited the free exercise of appellants’ religion.”36 This new
conception of free exercise rights created the potential for new claims against neutral
laws, neutrally applied as unconstitutional burdens on religious liberty.
This potential was realized with Sherbert v. Verner (1963).37 Adell Sherbert, a
Seventh-Day Adventist, was fired by her employer for refusing to work on Saturdays,
and could not find other work for the same reason. Sherbert filed a claim to receive
unemployment insurance, but it was rejected by the South Carolina Employment Security
Commission because state law mandated that candidates who refused to accept
employment were ineligible for unemployment insurance. Because Sherbert’s sole reason
for refusing to work was religiously motivated, she challenged the rejection of her claim
as a violation of her free exercise rights.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that the
South Carolina Unemployment Commission had violated Sherbert’s positive liberty to
the free exercise of religion. The Court stated that South Carolina had forced Sherbert “to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the
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other hand, [which] puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.”38 Just as a direct
penalty on religious action would clearly violate the Free Exercise Clause, so would any
provision of law which indirectly compromises a citizen’s ability to practice his religion
without due cause. Critically, the Court found no distinction in free exercise claims
between being denied a privilege, such as the unemployment insurance in question, and
being denied a government-provided right or liberty.39 Therefore, any citizen whose
religious practices are in any way impeded by state action, would be entitled to an
exemption even to a perfectly neutral and constitutional law, provided the claim in
question pass a two-pronged test.
This test, henceforth known as the Sherbert Test or the Compelling Interest Test,
would dominate the discussion, if not the results, of the Court’s Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence for the next 27 years. It comprises two parts: the former places the burden
of proof on the claimant, while the latter places the burden of proof on the government.
First, the claimant must show he has a sincerely held religious belief that the state has
substantially burdened his ability to act upon. If this is found to be true, an exemption
must be granted unless the government can prove that its law both furthers a compelling
state interest and does so in the manner least burdensome to religious practice. The Court
did not pull the Sherbert Test out of thin air; it was essentially just an appropriation of the
strict scrutiny standard first introduced in the famous Footnote Four of United States v.
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Carolene Products Co. (1938),40 and then solidified in Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942),41 and
Korematsu v. United States (1944).42 These cases established strict scrutiny as a threepronged test for statutes that requires the government to prove that there is a compelling
government interest for the statute, that the statute in question is narrowly tailored to
achieving said interest, and that the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving said
interest.
The Sherbert Court’s justification for using strict scrutiny is of paramount
importance here. By Sherbert in 1963, the Court had totally accepted the tiered scrutiny
standard of review established by Carolene. Tiered scrutiny was, at this point, a bipolar
standard.43 For most challenged laws, particularly “legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions,” the Court would apply the deferential rational basis test.44 As
described by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in Footnote Four of Carolene, a law under
rational basis review would not “be pronounced unconstitutional unless, in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of
the legislators.”45 This rational basis review represented a departure from the Court’s
jurisprudence of the early 20th century, which more thoroughly challenged the
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government’s legitimate power to pass laws. Cantwell, Murdock and Follett, despite
coming shortly after Carolene, represent the kind of scrutiny that the court applied in the
pre-tiered era.
But Carolene also established the converse of rational basis review: strict
scrutiny, the most exacting standard of review the Court uses or has ever used to test the
constitutionality of a law. Footnote Four of Carolene specifically outlined the three
scenarios in which the Court would use strict scrutiny. Justice Stone wrote that that
“[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation” either “appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments” or “restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation,” or contains “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.” 46
This first trigger, concerning “specific prohibition[s] of the Constitution,” has
been interpreted by the Court as mandating strict scrutiny when a law abridges a
“fundamental right.” Justice Stone’s Footnote Four lists some of these fundamental
rights, such as freedom of speech (citing Stromberg and Lovell), freedom of the Press
(citing Lovell), the right to vote (citing Herndon and Condon), and the right to assembly
(citing De Jonge).47 Critically, Carolene makes no mention of any sort of a fundamental
right to religious liberty or free exercise of religion. Fundamental rights are not solely
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those enumerated in the Constitution, however; the Court has since also recognized
unenumerated fundamental rights such as those to privacy,48 to procure an abortion,49 to
marry,50 to travel,51 and to make parenting decisions for one’s children.52
The second trigger listed in Carolene, concerning “restrict[ions] on those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation,” often overlaps with the first and third triggers outlined in Carolene, and
almost never pertains to free exercise cases. But the third trigger, “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities,” may be the key to understanding the confusion around
Sherbert’s logic and precedent. Footnote Four of Carolene states:
“Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
or national, […] or racial minorities, […]: whether prejudice against discrete and
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insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”
Interestingly, Justice Stone cites Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) for an example of
religious minorities as discrete and insular minorities deserving of strict scrutiny.53 Pierce
was not omitted from above discussions of the Court’s religious liberty jurisprudence by
accident, as it was not a free exercise case. Pierce involved a challenge from a Catholic
organization to an Oregon ballot initiative that mandated all children attend public
schools. The Court ruled unanimously for the Society of Sisters, striking down the
Oregon initiative. But Justice James McReynolds’s unanimous and solitary opinion in
Pierce recognized no religious grounds for ruling the law unconstitutional; rather, it
“[thought] it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children.”54 Therefore,
Pierce is a pure Fourteenth Amendment Due Process case. Justice McReynolds’s opinion
makes nary a mention of the Free Exercise Clause, religious liberty, or even the First
Amendment.55
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The Warren Court of 1953-1969 used strict scrutiny extensively in cases dealing
with discrete and insular minorities, also known as suspect classes.56 Most frequently,
discrete and insular minorities meant racial minorities,57 but the Court also granted
suspect status to classes such as children of unwed parents.58 Starting in 1976, the Court
recognized gender as a suspect class, although it applied a novel standard, intermediate
scrutiny, to apply to gender classifications, rather than strict scrutiny.59 Never, however,
did the Court explicitly list religious minorities as “discrete and insular,” and therefore
qualifying for judgement under strict scrutiny on those grounds.
Justice Brennan’s Court opinion in Sherbert is ambiguous as to why strict scrutiny
is applied. Its most direct claims suggest the Court viewing free exercise as a
fundamental right, as it repeatedly affirms Sherbert’s “constitutional right to the free
exercise of her religion.”60 But on a more granular level, Justice Brennan’s analysis
suggests that his application of strict scrutiny may be more motivated by Sherbert’s status
as a discrete and insular minority, and therefore consistent with Carolene, than his Court
opinion explicitly states. In particular, Justice Brennan speculates that Sherbert’s minority
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status was a necessary contributing factor to her rights being infringed, because the South
Carolina code read that "no employee shall be required to work on Sunday . . . who is
conscientiously opposed to Sunday work, and if any employee should refuse to work on
Sunday on account of conscientious . . . objections, he or she shall not jeopardize his or
her seniority by such refusal or be discriminated against in any other manner."61 Justice
Brennan notes that “[n]o question of the disqualification of a Sunday worshipper for
benefits is likely to arise, since we cannot suppose that an employer will discharge him in
violation of this statute. The unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian
is thus compounded by the religious discrimination which South Carolina's general
statutory scheme necessarily effects.”62 This reads more like an argument for protection
of a discrete and insular minority than a fundamental rights argument. And given that the
overwhelming majority of free exercise claims from 1879-1963 had come from religious
minorities,63 many of whom were discrete and insular groups, religious liberty would
seem to be a fitting arena to apply strict scrutiny for discrete and insular minorities,
particularly given Carolene’s dicta.
The personalized nature of religion would also seem to place the right to free
exercise exemptions more in the category of rights granted to minority groups than in the
category of fundamental rights. A law that unconstitutionally violates one citizen’s right
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to Free Speech would violate each citizen’s right equally, provided they spoke in the
same time, place and manner.64 Free exercise exemption rights, however, are
personalized by definition.65 The South Carolina Unemployment Commission’s holding
in Sherbert would not violate the free exercise rights of a Catholic whose Sabbath was on
Sunday, and nor would the vending license fees like those in Murdock and Follett violate
the free exercise rights of a reform Jew who felt no religious obligation to proselytize.
While Sherbert does not explicitly grant religious minorities discrete and insular status, it
also does not explicitly grant a fundamental right to free exercise, and the language of the
Sherbert majority opinion itself seems to support the reading of exemptions as applying
to discrete and insular minorities. Justice Brennan writes that “the extension of
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects
nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences.”66 Because the more popular strands of Christianity had their Sabbaths on
Sunday, those underrepresented religious groups which had different holy days needed
exemptions to compensate for their lack of political power.
Indeed, there is some question of whether the South Carolina statute was neutral
in the first place. The conventional, contemporary view is that Sherbert granted an
exemption from a neutral law, neutrally applied; but the particulars of South Carolina’s

“But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Department of City of Chicago v.
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unemployment scheme complicate that claim. Effectively, the state had already exempted
Methodists, Baptists and member of other Christian sects who hold Sunday as their
Sabbath from working on their holy day. The South Carolinian state legislature forbade
state textile plants from operating on Sundays except during times of “national
emergency,” itself perhaps a display of religious preference. Justice William O. Douglas
found that “Blue Laws”—laws like South Carolina’s which restrict certain, usually
commercial, activities on Sundays—were so preferential as to violate the Establishment
Clause. In a solitary dissent in McGowan v. Maryland (1961), he noted that “[n]o matter
how much is written, no matter what is said, the parentage of these laws is the Fourth
Commandment, and they serve and satisfy the religious predispositions of our Christian
communities” at the expense of those who do not hold Sunday as a religious day of rest. 67
South Carolina’s code itself strongly implied that the choice of Sunday as a rest
day was not neutral, but rather based on religious ideology—and therefore religious
preference. State law mandated that "no employee shall be required to work on Sunday . .
. who is conscientiously opposed to Sunday work, and if any employee should refuse to
work on Sunday on account of conscientious . . . objections, he or she shall not jeopardize
his or her seniority by such refusal or be discriminated against in any other manner."68
The requirement that a worker be “conscientiously opposed” to Sunday work to be
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exempted from it proves some religious motivation for the exemption, particularly given
that no days other than Sunday were granted similar status. Effectively, South Carolina
had already granted a religious exemption to its laws—but only to the predominant
religious group in the State, and to no other groups. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to
argue that South Carolina’s law was not neutral, and that granting an exemption to
Sherbert “reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality.”69
But regardless of the Court’s justification for the accommodationist Sherbert Test,
it was certainly a major departure from the Court’s previous Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence; Justice John Marshall Harlan II called Justice Brennan’s majority opinion
“disturbing both in its rejection of existing precedent and in its implications for the
future” in his dissent.70 Not only did Sherbert ramp up the scrutiny used for free exercise
exemptions from the rational basis standard to strict scrutiny, but it also directly
repudiated Cantwell’s mandate that no government official could pass judgement as to
whether a religious belief was valid. The Cantwell Court found that Connecticut’s
“appraisal of facts, […] exercise of judgment, and […] formation of an opinion,” in effect
“[d]etermin[ing whether] the cause is not a religious one,” qualified as “a censorship of
religion as the means of determining its right to survive” in violation of the First
Amendment.71 And yet Sherbert, while citing and ostensibly upholding Cantwell,72 went
so far as to require the state to judge the sincerity of religious beliefs, and the necessities
of religious conduct, through the first prong of its eponymous test. The jurisdictional
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view, which dominated the Court’s jurisprudence for the 84 years between Reynolds to
Sherbert, was now in jeopardy.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SHERBERT ERA, 1963-1990
Perhaps because of these departures from precedent, Sherbert’s own precedent
had only a tentative hold over Free Exercise Clause decisions in ensuing years.73
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), decided nearly a decade after Sherbert, was the Court’s first
strong affirmation of Sherbert, and a unanimous one.74 But like Sherbert, Yoder was far
from pellucid in its reasoning for applying strict scrutiny to the case at hand.
Yoder concerned a challenge to a Wisconsin law that mandated parents send their
children to accredited schools until the age of 16. Jonas Yoder challenged the
requirement as a violation of his (and his child’s) free exercise rights, as he wanted to
remove his child from school after the eighth grade in accordance with his traditional
Amish beliefs. In a supremely odd unanimous opinion, Chief Justice Warren Burger
affirmed Yoder’s claim, striking down the Wisconsin statute. Yoder does engage with the
Constitutional matters in question; for example, it explicitly rejects the belief conduct
barrier,75 it states that an accommodation would not violate the Establishment Clause,76 it
states that secular beliefs of conscience do not qualify for protection under the Free
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Exercise Clause,77 and it espouses an accommodationist understanding of the Free
Exercise Clause.78 The majority of Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, however, reads like a
panegyric to the Amish people and their culture. He spends a remarkably long time
discussing Amish customs and their value to society, stating that “the Amish
communities singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson's ideal of the
‘sturdy yeoman’ who would form the basis of what he considered as the ideal of a
democratic society.”79 Value judgments such as these are uncommon in Court opinions,
and were expressly denounced by the Cantwell ban on “appraisal of facts, […] exercise
of judgment, and […] formation of an opinion” over the validity of religious beliefs. And
yet, Yoder emphasizes again and again how the Amish provide a value to society. If one
takes free exercise as a fundamental right, such discussions are irrelevant; the Amish are
entitled to an exemption because it is their constitutional right, not because they are good.
But the Chief Justice spends significant energy justifying his decision based on the
Amish’s societal value. In addition to the Jefferson’s yeoman farmer comment, Chief
Justice Burger comments that:
“We must not forget that, in the Middle Ages, important values of the civilization
of the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who
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isolated themselves from all worldly influences against great obstacles. There can
be no assumption that today's majority is ‘right,’ and the Amish and others like
them are ‘wrong.’ A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no
rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”80

The last sentence in the paragraph above is wholly tautological; any common reading of
the Free Exercise Clause, whether jurisdictional or accommodationist, makes no
allowance for the state to condemn a religiously motivated way of life merely because it
is different. The passages cited above are telling, however, because they suggest that the
Amish’s value comes in large part from “their habits [which] do indeed set them apart
from much of contemporary society”—in other words, habits which together form a
discrete and insular lifestyle.81 Sixteen years after Yoder, Justice Brennan stressed the
importance of the Amish’s discrete and insular status, writing that “in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), we struck down a state compulsory school attendance law
on free exercise grounds not so much because of the affirmative coercion the law exerted
on individual religious practitioners, but because of "the impact that compulsory high
school attendance could have on the continued survival of Amish communities."82
Yoder would later grow to be seen as the next strongest affirmation of the
Sherbert Test and free exercise accommodationism after Sherbert, and the two cases
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were often cited adjacently in Court opinions espousing accommodationist views.83 But
in general, the Sherbert Test’s application between its inception and Employment
Division v. Smith in 1990 was relegated to certain classes of free exercise
accommodations claims, and even then not uniformly.84 For example, claims by
conscientious objectors appealing for exemptions from combat duty, such as in United
States v. Seeger (1965), Welsh v. United States (1970), and Gillette v. United States
(1971), did not have the Sherbert Test applied to them in any form,85 while the decisions
which most faithfully applied the Sherbert Test were, unsurprisingly, those from cases
dealing with unemployment insurance, where its precedent was clearest: Thomas v.
Review Board (1981) and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission (1987).86
Beyond these arenas, application of the Sherbert Test wavered. This could be
partially attributed to the dominance of Chief Justice Warren Burger over the Free
Exercise Clause exemption decisions handed down by his Court. In McDaniel v. Paty
(1978), United States v. Lee (1982), and Bob Jones University v. United States (1983),
the Chief Justice, who had also authored Yoder and Thomas, authored decisions applying
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different versions of the Sherbert Test. 87 In Bowen v. Roy (1986), however, his opinion
directly refuted the Sherbert Test.88 The facts of Roy were very similar to those in Lee: in
Roy, parents objected to the federal government assigning their daughter a Social
Security number and using it, whereas in Lee, an adult objected to being a participant in
Social Security payments and benefits. In Roy, Chief Justice Burger explained not using
the Sherbert Test by stating that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause affords an individual
protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an
individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures.”89 How
the claimant’s participation in Social Security was any more “dictat[ing] the
Government’s internal procedures” than Yoder dictating education procedures, Bob Jones
University dictating tax procedures or Lee dictating Social Security procedures remains
unclear. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing a separate concurrence, ascribed the Chief
Justice’s reluctance to apply the Sherbert Test in Roy to “[t]he fact that the underlying
dispute involves an award of benefits, rather than an exaction of penalties,” but rejected
this distinction in favor of applying the Sherbert Test. 90 After all, the unemployment
benefits in question in Sherbert were indeed benefits, and the Court there had no “doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing
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of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”91 Chief Justice Burger’s most direct rejection
of the Sherbert Test in Roy follows:
“We conclude then that government regulation that indirectly and incidentally
calls for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to
religious beliefs is wholly different from governmental action or legislation that
criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that
some find objectionable for religious reasons.”92
If this is not a departure from Sherbert, one wonders what instance of withholding a
benefit could not be shoehorned into the category of “criminaliz[ing] religiously inspired
activity.”
Goldman v. Weinberger (1986), argued the same day as Roy, was also a textbook
religious exemptions case, involving an orthodox Jew in the Air Force who requested to
wear a yarmulke with his military uniform.93 The Court rejected Goldman’s claim by a
narrow 5-4 vote, and the Court’s opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger but written by
his heir apparent, Justice William H. Rehnquist, made no mention whatsoever of Sherbert
or the Sherbert Test. Dissents by Justice Brennan and Justice O’Connor, both joined by
Justice Thurgood Marshall, forcefully argued that the Sherbert Test should be applied,
but Justice O’Connor admitted that the Court’s test for free exercise exemptions was no
settled matter, and that the Sherbert Test had not been consistently applied: “the Court in
the past has had some difficulty, even in the civilian context, in articulating a clear
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standard for evaluating free exercise claims that result from the application of general
state laws burdening religious conduct.”94 Justice O’Connor again declined to apply the
Sherbert Test in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz (1987), when the court heard a claim from
two Muslim inmates in a New Jersey prison who were unable to attend Friday worship
services because of their prison’s restrictive regulations.95 Justice O’Connor joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s 5-4 majority opinion, which upheld the prison’s regulations while
making no mention of Sherbert or the Compelling Interest Test. Justice Brennan’s dissent
in Shabazz, joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice Marshall, and, oddly, Justice Stevens, did
apply the Sherbert Test: Justice Brennan “would require prison officials to demonstrate
that the restrictions they have imposed are necessary to further an important government
interest, and that these restrictions are no greater than necessary to achieve prison
objectives.”96 The dissenters advocated remanding the case to the District Court, so the
prisoners’ claim could be reheard under the Sherbert standard. Again in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery (1988),97 Justice O’Connor declined to apply the Sherbert
Test. This time, she herself wrote the opinion which elected not to apply strict scrutiny:
“[Sherbert] does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government
programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but
which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their
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religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling justification
for its otherwise lawful actions.”98
This argument is compelling given the facts of the case in Lyng, where Native American
groups in Northwestern California objected to the Federal Government building a
highway through Six Rivers National Forest, which they held sacred. But the public
school system (Yoder), the state legislatures (McDaniel) and the military (Goldman) are
all government owned and operated as well—and as shown in Lee and Roy, the
distinction between government affairs and private affairs is no bright line. Illustrating
this point, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Harry Blackmun, dissented in
Lyng on the grounds that the Sherbert Test should be applied in the case at hand.99
This was the Court’s context and precedent for Employment Division v. Smith
(argued in 1989 and decided in 1990): a Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in flux, with
a somewhat clear test but no clear boundaries as to when to apply it. Amid this confusion,
Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion of the Court in Smith provided an emphatic, albeit
controversial, answer to the question of when exemptions from neutral laws were
necessary. His opinion harkened back to Reynolds, stating that “the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”100 Smith held that government cannot regulate
religious beliefs or practices as such, but where it has a legitimate interest in policing
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secular behaviors, it has the authority to do so; even if such policing “prohibit[s] the
exercise of religion [as an] incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”101 Smith returned the Court to a
jurisdictional standard practically indistinguishable from Reynolds’s belief/conduct
barrier, while also reinstating the Cantwell dictum that public officials shall pass no
judgement on whether or not something is a valid religious belief.
Smith concerned a challenge from Alfred Smith and Galen Black, two members
of the Native American Church. Smith and Black were fired from their jobs as drug
counselors after it was discovered that they had ingested peyote, a federally classified
Schedule I substance illegal under Oregon law, at a religious ceremony. When they
applied for unemployment insurance, their claims were denied, as they had been fired for
criminal activity. Smith and Black challenged this denial of unemployment benefits. The
Oregon Supreme Court found that, while Oregon state law did prohibit sacramental drug
use, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution.
By a 5-1-3 margin, the Court disagreed. Smith was not decided on strict partisan
lines; Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist,
moderate-conservative Justice Anthony Kennedy, liberal justice John Paul Stevens, and
Justice Byron White, a Kennedy appointee who dissented in Sherbert and is best
described as highly deferential to the political branches. The three outright dissenters
were on the liberal wing of the court; Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice
Blackmun’s dissent. Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion, joined in part by the three
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outright dissenters, that, while scathingly critical of Justice Scalia’s logic and refusal to
apply the Sherbert Test, concurred in judgement with the Court based on her application
of the Sherbert Test.
Regardless of his framework, the tortured reasoning of Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Smith left him open to criticism. Most egregiously, he claimed that “We have never held
that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”102 This is demonstrably false;
of the cases mentioned above, at least Yoder, Thomas, and Hobbie all granted exemptions
to neutral laws based on individuals’ religious beliefs. Justice Scalia explained away
Sherbert, Thomas and Hobbie by claiming that the Sherbert Test applies only to
unemployment insurance claims, as the Court has “never invalidated any governmental
action on the basis of the Sherbert Test except the denial of unemployment
compensation.”103 Intriguingly, he refrained from arguing that Sherbert, the genesis of the
unemployment insurance line of cases, did not concern a neutral law, neutrally applied;
this would have been a strong and easy argument, given that the Sherbert Court itself
found not neutrality, but rather “religious discrimination which South Carolina's general
statutory scheme necessarily effects.”104
Justice Scalia admitted that the Court “sometimes purported to apply
the Sherbert Test in contexts other than [unemployment insurance],” but he equated the
Court’s reluctance to find laws in violation of the test with the test’s limited applicability.
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Instead, Justice Scalia forwarded the novel proposition that the Sherbert Test applies only
to unemployment insurance, and therefore “is inapplicable to an across-the-board
criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct,” because “[t]he Sherbert test […]
was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct [and] a distinctive feature of unemployment
compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the
particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment.”105 This logic does not
hold up to scrutiny, however, as many accommodationists claim that many facially
neutral laws are not, in fact, neutral as applied, unless accommodations are granted to
those disproportionately affected by the statute. Consider Justice Brennan’s statement
from Sherbert: “the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with
Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality
in the face of religious differences.”106 Accommodationists could, and did, argue that the
federal government’s drug restrictions were not as neutral as Scalia claims they are;
indeed, accommodationism in general requires individualized judgements on a particular
claimant’s religious beliefs. There is also the awkward fact that Smith did concern a
petition to an unemployment claim, the one area where Justice Scalia admits Sherbert
does hold sway. Here, Justice Scalia explains the distinction convincingly: in Smith,
Smith and Black were fired for criminal activity, while in Sherbert, there was no criminal
prohibition on Sherbert’s refusal to work Saturdays.
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As much as Justice Scalia struggled to explain away Sherbert, Yoder provided an
even bigger obstacle. The claim that the Court had “never invalidated any governmental
action on the basis of the Sherbert Test except the denial of unemployment
compensation” finds support in the Burger Court’s reluctance to grant accommodations
even when applying the Sherbert Test, but Yoder clearly proves it false.107 Smith’s
explanation of Yoder is bizarre, and central to probably the most frequently criticized
portion of the opinion: the “hybrid case” claim. Justice Scalia claims that “[t]he only
decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.”108 He cites five
cases to support this claim: Pierce, Cantwell, Murdock, Follett, and Yoder. These are
accurate interpretations of Cantwell, Murdock, and Follett, each of which mentions
freedom of speech and the First Amendment in more general terms. Pierce, however,
provides no support to Scalia’s claim for two reasons: first, the Court did not grant an
accommodation in Pierce, but rather struck down the Oregon law facially, and second,
Pierce made no mention of the Free Exercise Clause or even the First Amendment, as it
was a straightforward Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause case.
The interpretation of Yoder as a “hybrid case” is just as tenuous, if not more so.
Yoder clearly stated that the religious nature of Yoder’s claim was prerequisite for his
constitutional claim, saying that “[a] way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may
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not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on
purely secular considerations.”109 Later, Chief Justice Burger states that the Court
“giv[es] no weight to such secular considerations.”110 Nowhere does Yoder mention
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or any constitutional right other than free
exercise. Yoder grants no right to direct a child’s education, and in fact dodges the
question entirely: “It is clear that such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the
area of religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom
comparable to those raised here and those presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.
S. 510 (1925). On this record, we neither reach nor decide those issues.”111 Yoder
provides no suggestion that it was anything more than a free exercise case—albeit an
oddly constructed one. Michael McConnell plausibly speculates that “the notion of
‘hybrid’ claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder [from Smith].”112
Why Justice Scalia goes to such great lengths to gerrymander Smith, Sherbert and
Yoder into a mutually permissive framework is an interesting question. Likely, Justice
Scalia was simply unwilling to overturn precedents that had become calcified, if only for
27 years. But Justice Scalia’s reluctance to overturn Sherbert, and similar cases like
Yoder, is uncharacteristic; he was a self-described originalist who was perfectly willing to
overturn precedent.113 Precedents get overturned: just as Sherbert rendered Reynolds and
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Cantwell dead letter, so too could Smith have overturned Sherbert. It is the particular
irony of Smith that Justice Scalia, the famous originalist, was hamstrung by precedents
less than half his age; he had 150 years of precedent on his side, but was so preoccupied
with the previous 27 that he left his Smith opinion open to attack.
And attacked it was. Justice O’Connor wrote a scathing concurrence, opening by
claiming that “today's holding dramatically departs from well settled First Amendment
jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the question presented, and is incompatible
with our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious liberty.”114 Like
McConnell and many others, she was particularly critical of Justice Scalia’s historical
analysis, saying that “the Court endeavors to escape from our decisions
in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them "hybrid" decisions […] but there is no denying
that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause […] and that we have
consistently regarded those cases as part of the mainstream of our free exercise
jurisprudence.”115 Perhaps in reaction to Justice Scalia, who she personally disliked,116
Justice O’Connor defended the Sherbert Test—or as she calls it, the compelling interest
test—more staunchly than ever before. Only two years prior, in Lyng, she (with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Stevens and White, all of whom voted with the
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majority in Smith) had refused to apply the Sherbert Test, while Justices Blackmun,
Brennan and Marshall—the Smith minority—elected to apply the Sherbert Test.117 But
now in Smith, Justice O’Connor defended the Sherbert Test by stating that even “laws
neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or intrude
upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion.”118 Coercion is the
operative word here; in both her Free Exercise Clause and her Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, Justice O’Connor used a vague coercion test that prevented the
government from coercing any person into action contrary to his beliefs or giving the
impression that it was endorsing any particular religion.119 But of course, any exemptions
claim can be framed as a remedy to government-induced coercion or “intru[sion] upon
[one’s] religious duties.” In Lyng, the Court found that “[e]ven assuming that the
Government's actions here will virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice their
religion, the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding
respondents' legal claims.” 120 Surely, virtual destruction of a class of people’s ability to
practice their religion must “intrude upon […] religious duties”—and yet, Justice
O’Connor still did not elect to apply the Sherbert Test in Lyng. Perhaps this is too critical
of Justice O’Connor, as it would be difficult for any moderate justice to construct a
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consistent framework out of the hodgepodge of decisions that comprised the Burger
Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
While she was harshly critical of the majority’s reasoning in Smith, Justice
O’Connor did agree with the Court in upholding Oregon’s policies. Justice O’Connor
found that outlawing peyote was an integral part of Oregon’s statutory scheme to prevent
illicit drug use. She also accepted this intended goal—preventing illicit drug use—as a
compelling interest, and accepted Oregon’s policies as the least burdensome and most
narrowly tailored policies possible that could still achieve the State’s goal, as “selective
exemption in this case would seriously impair Oregon's compelling interest in prohibiting
possession of peyote by its citizens.”121 Therefore, Oregon’s law passed the Sherbert
Test, and did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
The third and final opinion in Smith was Justice Blackmun’s. It was joined in full
by Justices Brennan and Marshall—the outright dissenters in Lyng, and three quarters of
the Court’s liberal wing. Like Justice O’Connor, Justice Blackmun believed that “a state
statute that burdens the free exercise of religion […] may stand only if the law in general,
and the State's refusal to allow a religious exemption in particular, are justified by a
compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means.”122 Also like Justice
O’Connor, Justice Blackmun expresses surprise at the Court’s decision, saying that
“Until today, I thought [the Sherbert Test] was a settled and inviolate principle of this
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.”123 Justice Blackmun does not attack Justice
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Scalia’s refusal to apply the Sherbert Test in depth, however, instead simply endorsing
Justice O’Connor’s arguments from the first and second sections of her opinion.
Justice Blackmun disagrees with Justice O’Connor’s analysis of the Sherbert
Test: to him, asking whether exemptions in general could prevent furtherance of
Oregon’s compelling interest is the wrong question. Rather, the Court should consider the
narrow point of granting exemptions only in cases exactly like those of Smith and Black:
“[i]t is not the State's broad interest in fighting the critical ‘war on drugs’ that must be
weighed against respondents' claim, but the State's narrow interest in refusing to make an
exception for the religious, ceremonial use of peyote.”124 Justice Blackmun notes that the
State has no evidence of religious peyote causing severe harm, and cites this as proof that
granted exemptions would not hinder furtherance of its legitimate inference. Therefore, a
statutory policy that denies Smith and Black an exemption is not the least burdensome
policy possible, and fails the Sherbert Test.
Justice Blackmun’s dissent echoes Yoder in one final, important way: he seems
preoccupied with proving that members of the Native American Church are assets to
society. He himself notes the similarity to Yoder, one of the first cases he heard as a
Justice: “just as in Yoder, the values and interests of those seeking a religious exemption
in this case are congruent, to a great degree, with those the State seeks to promote
through its drug laws.”125 Justice Blackmun also takes the unavoidable next step, stating
that these ‘values and interests’ might give Native Americans a privileged status over
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other groups claiming exemptions: “[a]llowing an exemption for religious peyote use
would not necessarily oblige the State to grant a similar exemption to other religious
groups.”126
Smith proved to be a pyrrhic victory for jurisdictionalism. Criticism of Scalia’s
opinion was rampant, and even jurisdictionalists who agreed with Scalia’s conclusions
found fault with his logic; jurisdictionalist scholar William P. Marshall said the Smith
opinion “exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise jurisprudence and its use
of precedent borders on fiction.”127 Within weeks of the Smith decision’s release on April
17, 1990, a handful of religious institutions opposed to Smith formed The Coalition for
the Free Exercise of Religion: a group solely dedicated to passing legislation that would
reinstate the Sherbert Test on a statutory level. Chapter Four describes the process of
passing that legislation, which would eventually become the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT, 1990-1993
By September 1990, within only five months of Smith, the Coalition for the Free
Exercise of Religion comprised 29 organizations. The bulk of these members were the
Coalition’s 10 Protestant groups (including the Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs, the Presbyterian Church (USA), and the United Methodist Church) and seven
Jewish groups (including the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish
Congress, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, and the Anti-Defamation
League).128 Also joining the Coalition were two groups representing other religious
minorities (Christian Science Committee on Publication and the Friends Committee on
National Legislation) and one group, Americans for Religious Liberty, which was
devoted to promoting religious tolerance in general. Six groups in the Coalition dealt
mainly with non-religious issues, most notably the prominent liberal organizations the
American Civil Liberties Union and People for the American Way. Interestingly, the
remaining two groups in the Coalition could be described as anti-religion: the American
Humanist Association and Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Both
organizations are avowedly atheistic (the American Humanist Organization’s current
official motto is “Good Without a God.”)129
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On July 26, 1990, Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY-13) introduced the first
congressional response to Smith: H.R. 5377, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.130
Section Two of H.R. 5377 was the relevant portion of the bill; it decreed that:
“A governmental authority may restrict any person's free exercise of religion only
if— (1) the restriction—
(A) is in the form of a rule of general applicability; and
(B) does not intentionally discriminate against religion, or among
religions; and
(2) the governmental authority demonstrates that application of the restriction to
the person—
A) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”
This was essentially a codification of strict scrutiny’s most common form, so that courts
would be obligated to apply the Sherbert Test to free exercise exemptions claims. H.R.
5377 received broad bipartisan support. It had 62 Democratic and 37 Republican
cosponsors, including future Speakers of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA 6th) and
Nancy Pelosi (D-CA 5th). But it was introduced late in the session, in the summer
between the primaries and the general elections for the 102nd Congress. The House
Judiciary Committee referred H.R. 5377 to its Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
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Rights (where, tellingly, it was filed under “Civil Rights and Liberties, Minority Issues).
Its hearing, held on September 27, 1990, was cursory and noncontroversial, and no
committee votes were taken on the bill. There was also a practically identical Senate
companion to H.R. 5377, S. 3254, which Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) introduced to the
Senate floor on October 26, 1990. 131 Because of time constraints, the Senate’s version of
the RFRA of 1990 did not even make it to committee, despite similar bipartisan
support.132 No votes were ever taken on the two RFRAs of 1990.
Despite H.R. 5377’s and S. 3254’s failure, religious liberty became a prominent
national issue in the years following Smith. The confirmation hearings of President
George H.W. Bush’s two Supreme Court nominees, David H. Souter and Clarence
Thomas, contained ample concern over Smith and its implications. During then-Judge
Souter’s confirmation hearings of September 13-19, 1990, Senator Arlen Spector (R-PA)
asked him outright if he “agree[d] with Justice O'Connor that when you impede on the
exercise of religion that there ought to be those two factors, a compelling State interest
and means narrowly tailored to achieve that interest?”133 Judge Souter’s response
indicated a preference for the Sherbert Test over the jurisdictional view:
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“I have not had personal reason to want to reexamine the strict scrutiny test which
has been applied in a lot of cases since Shurbert [sic]. I recognize the reasoning of
the majority opinion. I mean I can follow it; I understand what the Court was
saying in the Smith case. But I also recognize I think the fact that that case could
also have been examined under the Shurbert [sic] standard. And as you mentioned
or indicated a moment ago, that, of course, is exactly what Justice O'Connor did
in her concurring opinion in that case.”134
Judge Souter refused to provide any more specific opinions on Smith, as he believed that
“without any question, I think the development of that issue is something that if I were
confirmed would come before me.” Nevertheless, his above statements were enough to
give Senator Specter the impression that Souter had a “predisposition to side with Justice
O'Connor” on the application of the Sherbert Test in future cases.135 And the next year,
during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) went as
far as to say that “Just [sic] Souter, sitting not as a Federal judge, sitting as a State court
judge, said ‘I agree with O'Connor,’ no ifs, ands, buts about it, just click, bang, ‘I agree
with O'Connor’”—a tenuous claim at best, given Souter’s actual statements.136
Judge Thomas’s own confirmation hearings—held from September 10 to October
13, 1991—were significantly longer and more contentious than Judge Souter’s, as he
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faced sexual harassment allegations and significant opposition from civil rights groups.137
Nevertheless, Thomas was asked about Smith repeatedly. During the hearings of
September 10, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) asked Judge Thomas to “briefly discuss
the impact [Smith] has on the compelling State interest test established in Sherbert.”138
Judge Thomas responded with a relatively innocuous judgement: “I think it is an
important departure from prior approaches and it is one that anyone who approaches
these cases should be concerned about or at least be watchful for.” Three days later,
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Biden asked Judge Thomas a more probing
question on Smith: “Do you agree with Scalia's approach, or do you agree with
O'Connor's approach?”139 Judge Thomas’s response hinted at subtle criticism of Smith:
“Senator, I think as I indicated in prior testimony here, when the Sherbet [sic] test was
abandoned or moved away from in the Smith case […] I think that there was an
appropriate reason for concern, and I did note then that Justice O'Connor, in applying the
traditional test, reached the same result.” Later, Judge Thomas stated that “I cannot
express as [sic] preference” between the Scalia approach and the O’Connor approach,
because “I have not thought through those particular approaches, but I myself would be
concerned that we did move away from an approach that has been used for the past I
guess several decades.”140 Upon even further probing from Chairman Biden, Thomas
volunteered that “my concern about the approach taken by Justice Scalia is that it may
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have the potential and could have the potential of lessening protection, and I think the
approach that we should take certainly is one that maximizes those protections.”141
Interestingly, both Souter and Thomas, who would eventually take opposite
positions on the Court’s ideological spectrum (and on Smith itself) espoused nearly
identical opinions on Smith as it related to the Court’s religious liberty jurisprudence.
Judge Thomas was “concerned that we did move away from an approach that has been
used for the past […] several decades,” while Judge Souter likewise noted that “Once it is
determined that, in fact, their position is a genuinely religious position and that there is,
as a matter of fact, a burden placed upon it by a generally applicable State law, the Court
has traditionally, since the time of the Shurbert [sic] case, applied a standard, as you say,
of very strict scrutiny.” 142 Both prospective justices ignored, or at least failed to
mention, the jurisdictional free exercise standard that the Court had used prior to 1963. It
had been fewer than 30 years since Sherbert, but by the early 1990’s the jurisdictional era
of the 19th and early and mid-20th century was seen as almost literally prehistoric.
Meanwhile, the Coalition for Free Exercise of Religion continued to build
momentum. From 29 member organizations in September 1990, the Coalition reached 54
members by September 1992,143 and 66 by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s
eventual passage on November 16, 1993.144 These new additions came from similar
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backgrounds as the original Coalition: 10 new Protestant groups (for a total of 20), 10
new Jewish groups (for a total of 17), three new groups dedicated to religious liberty in
general (for a total of four) and ten new groups representing other religious minorities,
including the American Muslim Council, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
the Church of Scientology International, the Mennonite Central Committee, the Native
American Church of North America, and the National Sikh Center (for a total of 12).
Four new interest groups dealing primarily with non-religious issues joined the coalition
(for a total of 10), including the conservative organizations Coalitions for America and
the Rutherford Institute. In addition, 55 constitutional law scholars signed on to the
Coalition’s statement of intent. Oddly, the Coalition contained only one Catholic group at
the time of RFRA’s passage—the Jesuit Social Ministries National Office—despite
Catholicism being the largest religious domination in the United States.145 This reluctance
was explained during the hearings over the 102nd Congress’ versions of RFRA.
The year after H.R. 5377, on June 26th, 1991, Congressman Solarz introduced a
new RFRA: H.R. 2797, titled The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991.146 H.R.
2797 was an only slightly reworded version of Solarz’s bill from the previous year; it had
no substantial changes. The bill attracted a whopping 195 cosponsors; its support was
bipartisan but skewed Democratic, with 156 Democrats, 38 Republicans and one
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Independent signed on as cosponsors. As with the RFRA of 1990, there was a companion
Senate version of RFRA for the 102nd Congress, this time S. 2969.147 Senator Ted
Kennedy (D-MA) introduced the bill to the floor on July 2, 1992 with 26 coauthors: 18
Democrats and 8 Republicans. S. 2969 was referred to committee and received a hearing
there on September 18, 1992, but as in the previous session, most of the emphasis was on
the House version of RFRA.
On November 26th, 1991, five months after the house RFRA of 1991 was
introduced, Congressman Chris Smith (R-NJ-4) introduced a competing bill, H.R.
4040.148 Titled the Religious Freedom Act of 1991, H.R. 4040 was essentially a
Republican version of RFRA. It had 26 Republican and five Democratic cosponsors, but
each of the Democrats was southern and pro-life.149 The bulk of the Religious Freedom
Act was indistinguishable from Solarz’s RFRAs of 1990 and 1991, but it had three major
differences, found in Section 3-C-2:
“(2) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize a cause of action
by any person to challenge-(A) the tax status of any other person;
(B) the use or disposition of Government funds or property derived from
or obtained with tax revenues; or
(C) any limitation or restriction on abortion, on access to abortion

147

S. 2969, 102nd Cong. (1992).
H.R. 4040, 102nd Cong. (1991).
149
The Democrats were Marilyn Lloyd (D-TN-3), Alan Mollohan (D-WV-1), Richard Ray (D-GA-3), Billy
Tauzin (D-LA-3) and Harold Volkmer (D-MO-9). Lloyd changed heart and became pro-choice in 1992,
and Tauzin became a Republican in 1995.
148

55

services or on abortion funding.”
All three of these provisions addressed real concerns held within the right wing of the
RFRA coalition, it was the abortion concern that proved the biggest obstacle to RFRA’s
passage. This was largely because only a few months prior, on April 7th, 1991, the
ACLU had filed a federal challenge to a series of abortion restrictions passed by the Utah
State Legislature in 1990 and 1991.150 The ACLU, later joined by Planned Parenthood
and other groups, claimed the Utah abortion restrictions facially violated a plethora of
constitutional provisions including the right to privacy, due process liberty, equal
protection, freedom of speech, Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude,
Establishment Clause separation of church and state, and, most alarming for social
conservatives, a free exercise right to religious liberty.
This claim of abortion restrictions as violative of the Free Exercise Clause had
been successfully argued once before at the Federal District Court level, in McRae
v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).151 In that case, Judge John Dooling of the
Eastern District of New York extensively outlined the situations in which Conservative
and Reform Jewish teaching, the American Baptist Church, and the United Methodist
Church allow abortion, before concluding that “[t]hese teachings, in the mainstream of
the country's religious beliefs, and conduct conforming to them, exact the legislative
tolerance that the First Amendment assures [and t]he liberty protected by the Fifth
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Amendment extends certainly to the individual decisions of religiously formed
conscience to terminate pregnancy for medical reasons.”152
When the Supreme Court heard the case’s appeal in Harris v. McRae (1980),
however, it did not even judge the free exercise claims on the merits, as it found that “the
appellees […] lack standing to challenge the Hyde Amendment on free exercise grounds
because none alleged, much less proved, that she sought an abortion under compulsion of
religious belief.”153 Justice Brennan’s dissent mentioned “fundamental rights”
extensively, but he only explicitly claimed the “due process liberty right recognized
in Roe v. Wade” applied to the case at hand, not any free exercise claim.154 After Harris
v. McRae, there were no prominent free exercise challenges to abortion restrictions—
until the Utah case, which would eventually come to be called Jane L. v. Bangerter.155
That the ACLU was leading the fight for religious liberty, while simultaneously
arguing that religious liberty could provide a right to procure an abortion, alarmed many
on the right wing of the RFRA coalition. The Religious Freedom Act was perhaps an
inevitable response, but with Democratic majorities in both houses, and the vast majority
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of momentum for an anti-Smith bill already behind the RFRA-style bills, it never stood
much of a chance. Instead, the most strenuous debate over RFRA’s relation to religiously
motivated abortions came out in the hearings over H.R. 2979 (the House’s Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1991).156 The House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights held the hearings on May 13th and 14th 1992, some 11 months after
the bill was introduced to the floor. The hearings were lengthy and contentious, and from
the outset, Henry Hyde (R-IL 6th)—he of the Hyde Amendment challenged in McRae v.
Califano/Harris v. McRae—championed the right-wing opposition to RFRA. His
opposition was fairly straightforward, and he seemed particularly concerned by the Jane
L. v. Bangerter case:
“H.R. 2797 seeks to overturn the Smith decision. While I agree that legislation is
necessary, in light of the propensity of important proabortion groups such as the
ACLU and the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights to assert a first
amendment right to abortion under the free exercise clause, I cannot support H.R.
2797 in its current form. My primary objection is based on the bill's predictable
impact on abortion law.”157
Congressman Hyde’s opposition was later echoed by the Catholic representative on the
first panel of experts: Mark E. Chopko, representing the United States Catholic
Conference.158 Chopko briefly discussed the Church’s qualms about tax-exempt status

156

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., May 13-14, 1992.
157
Ibid, at 7.
158
The Catholic Church was the only religious group to testify against H.R. 2979, although the Lutheran
Church, Missouri Synod also opposed the bill for similar reasons. (Ibid, at 49).

58

and government funds used on religion, but his main concern with RFRA was the avenue
it provided for abortion claims. Chopko claimed that “[t]here is no question that abortion
is within the scope of activities which the people who drafted this legislation intend will
be offered into the courts, and it is certainly, if you believe the public statements of those
drafters, a certain number of them are expected to succeed.”159
The other two experts on the first panel—Robert Dugan, Jr., representing the
National Association of Evangelicals and Elder Dallin H. Oaks, representing The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints—were unconcerned by the abortion argument
because, as Dugan stated in his opening statement, “five Justices presently sitting on the
Supreme Court other than Justices Souter and Thomas have unequivocally said that the
State does have a compelling interest in protecting unborn human life throughout the
pregnancy.”160 Why the National Association of Evangelicals and the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, which, like the Catholic Church, were and are staunchly prolife, would be far less concerned than the Catholic Church was about the prospective
abortion claims is a matter of speculation. Perhaps the gap came from vestigial distrust
from the early 20th century, when religious jurisprudence conflicts were usually Catholic
v. Protestant rather than Secular v. Religious. More likely, Catholics were simply more
opposed to abortion than Protestants were in the early 1990’s; as recently as the early
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1970’s, most Protestant churches had supported liberalizing abortion laws, unlike the
Catholic Church.161
For Congressman Hyde, the Catholic Church and other right-wing RFRA
skeptics, the inconsistent application of the Sherbert Test in the pre-Smith years fueled
their fear over the prospective claims to a free exercise right to abortion; Chopko notes
that “the Court has not applied a compelling interest analysis with any uniformity across
the board to all claims and all times and all circumstances. That has led us to be a little bit
skeptical about especially the area of abortion and the cooperation with public
programs.”162 They also feared that RFRA would be an expansion, rather than a
restoration, of religious freedom. Hyde correctly pointed out that, even during the most
accommodationist period of the Court’s history, the Sherbert Test was applied
inconsistently, and therefore concluded that “if by Federal statute Congress requires
courts to utilize the strict scrutiny standard, the most rigorous constitutional inquiry as
applied in Sherbert and Yoder, the admitted highwater mark of free exercise
jurisprudence, it is far more likely that plaintiffs asserting a free exercise claim will
prevail on their claims than they did prior to Smith.”163 This was largely because:
“H.R. 2797 does not restore the law because it would apply the strict scrutiny
standard to free exercise claims involving prison and military regulations and
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government management of its own internal affairs. Prior to Smith, the Supreme
Court has held on numerous occasions that the strict scrutiny analysis was not
applicable in these situations. H.R. 2797 contains no exceptions, and would thus
apply the strict scrutiny analysis to all government action, burdening religious
exercise. While the policy behind this application may or may not be sound, it is
undoubtedly a significant expansion of the law which existed prior to Smith and
not a restoration.”164
The inconsistent application of the Sherbert Test during the Burger Court years, which
had once puzzled justices, now caused confusion and trepidation in lawmakers.
Even among the pro-RFRA wtinesses in the H.R. 2979 hearings, the fault lines
that would eventually lead to the fracturing between the right and left wings of the RFRA
coalition were obvious. The right wing of the coalition referred to free exercise as a
“fundamental right,” uniform and akin to those rights “to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of […] assembly, and other fundamental rights.”165 The
left wing of the coalition, however, saw free exercise rights as discrete and insular
minority protections, as the court opinions of Justice Brennan in Sherbert, Chief Justice
Burger in Yoder and others had suggested. Nadine Strossen, representing the ACLU,
expressed concern that:
“Essentially, the Court has told us that all that is left of religious liberty is this:
You only have a claim under the Constitution if you can show, as a member of a
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minority religious group, that the Government that passed a measure that
infringes your religious liberty did so intentionally and deliberately—maliciously,
willfully, and wantonly singling you out on the basis of your religion.”166
(emphasis mine).
Later under questioning, Strossen claimed that “the whole purpose of the Bill of Rights,
including the freedom of religion clause, is precisely to protect minority groups from the
tyranny of the majority”—an apt summary of the left wing of RFRA’s view of free
exercise protections, and one not shared by the right wing of the coalition, which held the
uniform fundamental right view.167 Many of the northern and western legislators involved
in RFRA’s passage echoed these left-wing accommodationist views. Senator Daniel
Inouye’s (D-HI) statement in support in RFRA dealt entirely with RFRA’s relation to the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978.168 Congressman Ben Cardin (D-MD-3)
gave four examples of religious practices which had been compromised by the Smith
standard: all four dealt with beliefs of religious minorities.169 Congressman Bob Franks
(R-NJ-7) wrote that “implications are especially burdensome for those whose beliefs lie
within the religious minority[…] It is my understanding that the Founding Fathers
authored the first amendment to protect religious minorities from exactly the kind of
Government discrimination which has resulted from the Smith decision.”170
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Despite the differences between the right-wing and the left-wing camps, the
accommodationist position completely dominated the RFRA discussions. Even the
harshest of RFRA critics, such as Henry Hyde and Mark Chopko, stopped short of
espousing a jurisdictionalist view, instead objecting to specific provisions of the
Democratic bills while still asserting their support of a RFRA-like bill that would address
their three specific concerns.171 Professor Ira Lupu, an expert witness during the H.R.
2797 hearings, would later lament that “[t]he debate and deliberation one might have
expected to surround such a sweeping and unprecedented enactment never occurred.”172
Out of the dozens of expert witnesses who testified on H.R. 2797, only one, Dean Herbert
W. Titus of Regent University School of Law, recommended Congress take a
jurisdictional approach to free exercise.173 Titus argued that a jurisdictional system like
the one used by the Court before Sherbert actually provided more protection to religious
liberty, because “[t]he spheres of civil and ecclesiastical authority were constitutionally
separate. The State could not intrude upon the church's domain, no matter what the State's
interest and no matter how compelling.”174
Titus also gave the Subcommittee the prescient warning that RFRA “would
probably be found unconstitutional as an exercise of congressional power according to
footnote 10 of Justice William Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach and Morgan.”175 Titus’s
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opinion was not unique: Mark Chopko said that he “needed to satisfy myself at least that
I was not asking my clients, the bishops, to explore a legislative remedy that would be
doomed to an unconstitutional result” and Ira Lupu correctly predicted that “the act as
drafted, as it is designed to rest on Congress' power to enforce the 14th amendment, is
unconstitutional as applied to the States” because Congress lacks “constitutional authority
to tell State governments and State administration that they must go in a direction that is
opposite to what the Supreme Court has held.”176
Congress’ stated authority for passing RFRA was Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which states that “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”177 The pertinent “provisions of the article” for
RFRA were the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, both contained in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which together state that “No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall […] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”178 The Due Process Clause contains all fundamental rights, and
would therefore be more suggestive of a right-wing accommodationist perspective, while
the Equal Protection Clause is the main rationale for protection of discrete and insular
minorities, and is therefore more suggestive of a left-wing accommodationist perspective.
Unfortunately, Congress had little debate over which clause(s) of the Fourteenth
Amendment it was enforcing and why; indeed, there was nearly total silence on the
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authority for Congress to impose RFRA on the states, suggesting a false security as to
RFRA’s constitutionality which would eventually be debunked in City of Boerne v.
Flores (1997).
Ultimately, the skepticism of Hyde, the Catholic Church and other like-minded
opponents proved sufficient to stop H.R. 2797, and neither it nor its companion Senate
version, S. 2969, received a committee or floor vote. The fortunes of RFRA changed,
however, on December 17, 1992, when the United States District Court for the District of
Utah released its decision on the ACLU’s challenge in Jane L. v. Bangerter.179 Judge J.
Thomas Greene upheld the majority of Utah’s abortion restrictions, and rejected the
plaintiffs’ Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims outright.180 The two sections of
Utah code that were overturned were struck down based on the Due Process right to
privacy found in Roe, and “the legal theories of involuntary servitude, equal protection,
separation of church and state, free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the
corresponding state constitutional claims [we]re not interrelated with the theories behind
the successfully prosecuted claims.”181 After the Jane L. case, the religiously mandated
abortion argument became something of a non-issue to the right wing of the RFRA
coalition. Jane L. was eventually appealed up to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, but the
Circuit Court’s August 2, 1995 opinion did not even address the plaintiffs’ free exercise
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claims on the merits, and no high-profile case since has seriously argued the free exercise
claim.182
Congressman Solarz lost reelection in 1992, but his fellow New Yorker Charles
Schumer (D-NY-9) took up the torch and introduced the 103rd Congress’ version of
RFRA: H.R. 1308, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. Congressman
Schumer introduced H.R. 1308 to the House floor on March 11, 1993 with an astonishing
170 cosponsors—122 Democrats, 47 Republicans, and 1 Independent. This time, the
Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod and the right-wing
accommodationists who were previously skeptical of RFRA dropped their opposition.
Partly, this was because of the resolution of the Jane L. case and the apparent conclusion
to the free exercise claims to procure an abortion, but it was also due in part to H.R.
1308’s new section, not present in the RFRAs of the previous session. Section 7 of H.R.
1308 is included in its entirety below:
SEC. 7. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNAFFECTED.
(a) In General.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect,
interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment
prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion. Granting
government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, shall not
constitute a violation of this Act.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``granting
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government funding, benefits, or exemptions'' does not include a
denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions.”
In a sense, Section 7 was purely tautological; obviously Congress did not intend H.R.
1308 to violate any part of the Constitution. But the new Section was significant for two
reasons: first, it was an olive branch to the Catholic Church and other RFRA skeptics
who feared that RFRA could challenge tax-exempt status and government funding of
certain religiously affiliated organizations, and second, it showed that Congress had at
least some trepidation that the courts might see some merit in the Establishment Clause
claim against RFRA.
H.R. 1308 went through the legislative process nearly seamlessly. It passed the
Judiciary committee without a hearing and then passed the House on May 11 via a
unanimous, 435-0 voice vote with no abstentions—not even Henry Hyde. In the Senate,
H.R. 1308 faced a minor obstacle as some Senators objected to the bill’s protection of
prison inmates. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), with 3 Democratic and 3 Republican
cosponsors, proposed Amendment 1083 “[t]o prohibit the application of this Act, or any
amendment made by this Act, to an individual who is incarcerated in a Federal, State, or
local correctional, detention, or penal facility.”183 The Senate’s primary concern over
H.R. 1308 was that, by applying the Sherbert Test to prisoners, RFRA would create an
unacceptably high standard of rights for convicted criminals. As Congressman James
Traficant (D-OH-17th) summarized the general sentiment of those in support of
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Amendment 1083: “we here in America have bent over backward on prisoners and criminals rights, I think what we have done is forgotten the victims.”184 On October 27, 1993
Senator Reid’s Amendment failed, 41-58, with one abstention. The vote did not split on
party lines; 18 Democrats and 23 Republicans supported the amendment, while 37
Democrats and 21 Republican opposed. That same day, the Senate passed a minor,
semantic, amendment to H.R. 1308 by unanimous voice vote, replacing “burden” with
“substantially burden.” The Senate then passed H.R. 1308 in its final form by a 97-3
margin. The three holdouts—Robert Byrd (D-WV), Jesse Helms (R-NC), and Harlan
Mathews (D-TN)—voted against RFRA because of concerns over expanding free
exercise rights of prisoners. All three of the Senators had voted for the Reid amendment,
and Helms and Mathews had consponsored it. Senator Helms had the added concern that
“the Religious Freedom Restoration Act has less to do with our legal and historical
notions of religious liberties than it does with the creation of new rights and employment
opportunities for the nation’s lawyers” because of the new litigation claims that RFRA
would authorize.185
On November 3, the House accepted the Senate’s amendment without objection.
Two days later, H.R. 1308 was presented to President Bill Clinton. On November 16,
1993, President Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and it
became Public Law number 103-141.186 President Clinton’s signing message “especially
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thank[ed] the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion for the central role they played
in drafting this legislation and working so hard for its passage,” and the President
humorously remarked that RFRA’s extremely broad support “shows, I suppose, that the
power of God is such that even in the legislative process miracles can happen.”187 Here
was the high-water mark of consensus on the Free Exercise Clause; Democrats and
Republicans, left-wing accommodationists and right-wing accommodationists alike
celebrating these new protections for religious liberty.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FROM RFRA TO BOERNE, 1993-1997
It is still controversial how much impact the Smith standard had on free exercise
exemptions claims in the three and a half years between the Smith decision in April 1990
and RFRA’s passage in November 1993. While there is some qualitative evidence that
suggests religious minorities, in particular, were less likely to turn to the courts between
Smith and RFRA, they were still much more likely to sue under RFRA than members of
mainstream religions; only 4% of RFRA claims were brought by mainstream Protestants,
who comprised 21% of the American population at the time.188 Furthermore, a 2004
quantitative compiling of all federal court free exercise cases between 1980-2004 found
that Smith and RFRA did each have significant impact on court decisions, as the
percentage of favorable decisions for free exercise claims went from 39% before Smith,
to 29% between Smith and RFRA, to 45% after RFRA.189 This data may be misleading,
however, as it groups all free exercise claims together instead of looking only at
exemptions cases. Looking solely at RFRA exemptions cases paints a different picture: of
the 144 federal court decisions involving RFRA exemptions claims between RFRA’s
passage and Boerne in June 1997, the courts denied relief in 126 cases and granted it in
only 18.190 The 24 state court decisions adjudicating on RFRA claims had a similar
breakdown: 17 judgments against the free exercise claims, and 7 in favor. This ratio was
little different from that of the porous strict scrutiny applied before Smith: James Ryan’s
1992 study compiled all the Federal circuit court and Supreme Court free exercise
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exemptions cases between 1980 and 1990 and found that, in 85 of the 97 cases, the court
ruled that the statute in question passed strict scrutiny, and denied the exemption.191
The biggest difference between post-RFRA accommodationism and pre-Smith
accommodationism was the relative success of minority and mainstream religions. Courts
before Smith had applied a version of the Sherbert Test that was at least flavored by a
discrete and insular minority view of strict scrutiny. Every Supreme Court free exercise
exemptions case from Sherbert in 1963 until Smith in 1990 concerned a claim from a
religious minority: Seventh-Day Adventists in Sherbert and Hobbie, Amish in Yoder and
Lee, a Jehovah’s Witness in Thomas, a Muslim in Shabazz, an Orthodox Jew in Goldman,
and Native Americans in Roy, Lyng and Smith. Therefore, the latent divide between the
left-wing, minority protections view of free exercise accommodationism and the rightwing, fundamental rights view of accommodationism never had reason to appear. But
RFRA’s universal Sherbert Test was now applied to all cases from mainstream
Christians, without judicial choice of when to apply strict scrutiny. This change had
dramatic effect. In many respects, RFRA’s accommodationism benefitted members of
well-represented religions more than it benefitted religious minorities: for example, 65%
of religious claims initiated by mainline Protestants during the first ten years of RFRA
were successful, compared to only 37% for non-Christian minority groups.192
In total the RFRA-mandated strict scrutiny standard applied in federal courts after
RFRA is less stringent than many other forms of strict scrutiny. Adam Winkler’s 2006
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empirical analysis of strict scrutiny cases across federal courts found that, while
application of strict scrutiny truly is “fatal” to the law’s chance of survival in most
subject areas, “[t]here is one area of law in which strict scrutiny has been widely
recognized to be less than fatal in practice: free exercise cases.”193 Finally, at the level of
administrative policy, Ira Lupu found that “there is absolutely no evidence that RFRA did
anything to protect religion in decision making by the agencies of the United States.”194
Altogether, there is little evidence that any of the late Sherbert-to-Smith era, the brief
Smith era, the pre-Boerne RFRA era and the post-Boerne RFRA era were significantly
better than the others at protecting religious liberty.
And yet, there was a remarkable tendency for anti-Smith scholars and legislators
to exaggerate the decision’s effects to the apocalyptic. In 1997, Craig Anthony Arnold
wrote that “Ultimately, Smith will come to be viewed as the Plessy of the 20th century.”195
Anecdotally but tellingly, during the Thomas confirmation hearings, the example that
Senator Joe Biden gave for how Smith had affected religious liberty was a New Mexico
law which banned minors from drinking alcohol under any circumstances—which,
therefore, would prevent children from taking Catholic communion. Biden gave the law
as an example to show that “clearly, under the test applied by Scalia, such a law could be
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passed and it would be held constitutional”—the irony of which is that the law was struck
down immediately by a New Mexico court, and never reached the Supreme Court.196
There was only one major free exercise case between Smith and RFRA: Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, argued in November 1992 and decided in June
1993.197 In Lukumi, the Court heard a challenge to a 1987 city ordinance from Hialeah,
Florida that prohibited animal slaughter. The Court unanimously agreed with the
appellants that the ordinance was targeted at the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, a
Santeria church which includes animal sacrifice as part of its religious doctrine and
practice. Lukumi was not an exemptions case: the Court struck down the law facially and
totally.
The petitioners, for whom Douglas Laycock advocated, did not challenge Smith,
but rather claimed that the Hialeah ordinances were not neutral.198 Consistent with Smith,
Justice Kennedy held that “[a] law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice
without a secular meaning discernible from the language or context.”199 But to Justice
Kennedy and the Court, “[f]acial neutrality is not determinative” of neutrality, as “[t]he
Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial
discrimination” and “[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial
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neutrality.”200Justice Kennedy used records of the Hialeah City Council hearings to
establish legislative intent, which he found supported the conclusion that “[t]he
ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion.”201 Justice Kennedy ruled that
“the ordinances by their own terms target this religious exercise,” and “suppress[ed]
much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends
asserted in their defense.”202 The ordinances were not neutral and not narrowly tailored,
and therefore violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Ironically, the Lukumi opinion was harsh toward free exercise in a way that many
had falsely accused Smith of being. At the beginning of Section 3—a section joined by
seven justices, all but Blackmun and O’Connor—Justice Kennedy casually inserted the
novel statement that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”203 This sounds
innocuous enough, but it is actually a departure from traditional jurisdictional view that a
non-neutral law is inherently unconstitutional.204 Justice Scalia wrote in Smith that nonneutral laws were not merely subject to heightened scrutiny, but were unconstitutional
ipso facto:
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“a state would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise (of religion)’ if it sought to ban
such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or
only because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be
unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of ‘statues that are to be used for
worship purposes,’ or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.”205
Doubtless unconstitutionality is a far cry from strict scrutiny, especially strict scrutiny as
the Court had applied it to free exercise claims during the Burger Court years.
Justice Kennedy’s divergence from precedent was not lost on Justice Blackmun,
the lone outright dissenter in Smith left on the Court after Justices Brennan and
Marshall’s retirements. The bulk of Justice Blackmun’s opinion argued in favor of
applying the Sherbert Test rather than Smith’s laxer neutrality test (unsurprisingly, Justice
O’Connor joined Justice Blackmun’s opinion in full).206 But Justice Blackmun took
particular offense to Justice Kennedy’s statement that laws not neutral to religion could
potentially be constitutional:
“When a law discriminates against religion as such, as do the ordinances in this
case, it automatically will fail strict scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner […]
because a law that targets religious practice for disfavored treatment both burdens
the free exercise of religion and, by definition, is not precisely tailored to a
compelling governmental interest.”207
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Justice Blackmun’s argument here is compelling from an accommodationist perspective,
as a law which is not neutral to religion. But the jurisdictional argument against nonneutral laws is just as strong: that a non-neutral law is targeting a religion as such is proof
that its reach goes beyond the purely secular, and therefore beyond the government’s
legitimate jurisdiction.208
There were two other concurring opinions in Lukumi. Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote to express disagreement with Justice Kennedy’s reliance
on legislative intent as a valid source to prove the law’s lack of neutrality, “because it
departs from the opinion's general focus on the object of the laws at issue to consider the
subjective motivation of the lawmakers.”209 Refusal to consider legislative intent as part
of his decisions was a favored hobby horse of Justice Scalia’s, as he found it “virtually
impossible to determine the singular ‘motive’ of a collective legislative body.”210
Lastly, Justice Souter wrote an opinion almost exclusively dedicated to attacking
Smith. Justice Souter echoed the common criticism that “[t]hough Smith sought to
distinguish the free-exercise cases in which the Court mandated exemptions from secular
laws of general application, […] I am not persuaded” because “[i]f a hybrid claim is
simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception
would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”211 But not only does Justice
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Souter question the wisdom of Smith, he also questions its legitimacy, saying that
“[t]he Smith rule, in my view, may be reexamined consistently with principles of stare
decisis [as] the Smith rule was not subject to ‘full-dress argument’ prior to its
announcement.”212 Justice Souter then went even farther, speculating that:
“The Smith rule's vitality as precedent is limited further by the seeming want of
any need of it in resolving the question presented in that case […] I think a rule of
law unnecessary to the outcome of a case, especially one not put into play by the
parties, approaches without more the sort of ‘dicta ... which may be followed if
sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.’”213
Throughout his opinion, Justice Souter argued that “the Court should reexamine the
rule Smith declared,” revealing that his testimony during his confirmation was an
accurate, if understated, depiction of his thoughts on Smith.214 Justice Thomas, however,
joined the majority opinion but not those of Justices Blackman or Souter, suggesting that
he approved of the Smith ruling, or would at least let it stand. The Court’s pro-Smith
majority was now up to 6-3.
Shortly after Lukumi, the Court’s composition changed further. First, in June
1993, Justice Byron White retired, to be replaced soon thereafter by Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. Then, on August 3, 1994, Justice Harry Blackmun retired and was immediately
replaced by Stephen Breyer, who had already been confirmed. Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer faced relatively easy confirmation battles, and were confirmed by wide margins of
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96-3 and 87-9, respectively. Smith, RFRA, and free exercise exemptions generally were
not nearly as pressing concerns after RFRA’s passage, and Ginsburg and Breyer received
only minimal questioning on those topics, particularly when compared to what Justices
Souter and Thomas received.215 Judge Ginsburg only received one at her confirmation
hearing, on July 22, 1993. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) noted that Judge Ginsburg had
“urged the strict scrutiny standard for equal protection” for cases involving “rights for
women,” and then asked Judge Ginsburg: “Do you think that strict scrutiny is any less
applicable to the free exercise clause of the first amendment, free exercise of religious
freedom under the first amendment?”216 Judge Ginsburg dodged the question entirely,
saying that she would only “address questions that come to me in the context of a specific
case, on the basis of the facts of that specific case, on the record that is presented in that
case, on the arguments the lawyers make, and on the applicable law and precedent, but
[...] not address an abstract issue.” Judge Breyer’s questioning, on July 12, 1994 was
similarly scant. He only revealed his philosophy only once; when pressured by Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-UT) to explain his views on RFRA, Judge Breyer said nothing more than
that “[t]he principle is absolutely right.”217
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RFRA did impose changes from the Sherbert and Smith eras beyond the relative
success of religious minorities’ claims: most notably in prisons. The concerns of Jesse
Helms and the other supporters of Harry Reid’s proposed amendment were vindicated, as
claims from prison inmates initiated 94 of the 144 federal court decisions involving
RFRA between RFRA’s passage and Boerne (June 25, 1997).218 During the National
Governors’ Association Meeting of July 30-August 1, 1995, the Association adopted a
policy statement resolution that “the Governors believe Congress should enact legislation
without delay that would […e]xclude prison and jail inmates or any person held or
incarcerated as a pretrial detainee from provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act.”219 Only two days before, on July 28, 1995, Senator Harry Reid had again tried to
limit RFRA’s application to prisons. He proposed a bill, S. 1093, which would amend
RFRA by adding a section which stated:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act or any
amendment made by this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way
address that portion of the First Amendment regarding laws prohibiting the free
exercise of religion, with respect to any individual who is incarcerated in a
Federal, State, or local correctional, detention, or penal facility (including any
correctional, detention, or penal facility that is operated by a private entity under a
contract with a government).”220
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S.1093 had only four cosponsors: Reid’s fellow Nevadan Senator Richard Bryan (D-NV)
and three Republican Senators. In a speech on the Senate floor, Senator Bryan cited and
endorsed the statement from the National Governors’ Association that RFRA “threatens
the ability of prison officials to effectively manage state and local correctional
institutions,” and promotes “extensive litigation and an explosion of frivolous petitions
by prisoners demanding accommodations for specific religious activities [that has] a
detrimental impact on the costs of operating correctional institutions.”221 S.1093 was
referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, but never received a hearing or a vote,
even in newly Republican-dominated Congress.222 Senator Reid returned with an
identical bill, S. 206, for the 105th Congress, and introduced it on January 28, 1997, this
time with only two cosponsors: Senators John Breaux (D-LA) and Thad Cochran (RMS).223 Again, the bill died quietly in committee.
Meanwhile, in 1993, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, Patrick Flores,
applied for a building permit to expand the church in nearby Boerne, Texas. The Boerne
church was considered a contributing property to a historic district, however, so the local
zoning commission denied Archbishop Flores’s request. Flores filed suit under RFRA,
saying the commission’s denial of expansion burdened the free exercise of the local
Catholic congregation. In March 1995, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas heard Flores’s case, and struck down RFRA as an overbroad reach of
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Congress’ Section 5 authority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.224 On January 23, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, ruling for Flores and upholding RFRA as
fully constitutional.225 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari, and heard oral
argument for City of Boerne v. Flores on February 19, 1997.226 On June 25, 1997, the
Court released its decision, which reversed the circuit court’s decision and struck down
RFRA as applied to the states.
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, the judgment of
which was joined by a 6-3 majority. Justice Kennedy’s opinion first described the facts of
the case, and then affirmed the Court’s adherence to the Smith precedent. The crux of his
argument, however, had nothing to do with free exercise or religious liberty, but instead
refuted Congress’ claim that RFRA was an acceptable use of Congress’ Fourteenth
Amendment authority over the states. Boerne was one of the strongest affirmations of
judicial supremacy yet handed down by the Court. Justice Kennedy wrote that, while
“Congress can enact legislation under § 5 enforcing the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion,” its power “extends only to ‘enforc(ing)’ the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” and no more.227 Congress has a “remedial” power, but not an
interpretive power:
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“The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the
suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does
not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given
the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation.”228
Furthermore, RFRA could not be seen as remedial or preventative measure, the two
acceptable forms of constitutional authority that would give Congress Section 5 power
over the states, because “RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections.”229 Given that Smith was still precedent, Congress could only
enforce a jurisdictional interpretation of free exercise on the states. RFRA was too far.
There were six opinions in Boerne: every Justice save Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg wrote separately. Four of the six opinions—all but
Justice Stevens’s and Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court—are almost exclusively
concerned with the specter of Smith and its precedent. Justice O’Connor was now the
only dissenter left from Smith, and the seven intervening years had tempered none of her
ire towards Justice Scalia’s opinion. Her Boerne opinion only briefly endorses the
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Court’s reasoning as to the federalism question involved, saying that “if I agreed with the
Court's standard in Smith, I would join the [majority] opinion,” before launching into an
attack on the Smith ruling.230 While her opinion in Smith was primarily concerned with
Court precedent, her opinion in Boerne attacked Justice Scalia on his own originalist
terms by citing James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, state laws from
the pre-Revolution period, and 18th century state constitutions.231 Throughout this
analysis, she reaffirmed that the “[Free Exercise] Clause is best understood as an
affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices and conduct without
impermissible governmental interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a
neutral, generally applicable law.”232 Justice O’Connor also made clear that she “would
direct the parties to brief the question whether Smith represents the correct understanding
of the Free Exercise Clause and set the case for reargument” to “simultaneously put our
First Amendment jurisprudence back on course and allay the legitimate concerns of […]
Congress.”233
These beliefs were echoed by Justice Breyer and Justice Souter. Justice Breyer
wrote a brief opinion, clarifying that he joined the O’Connor dissent in full, save for the
brief paragraph where she endorsed the Court’s federalism argument. Justice Breyer
agreed that Smith should be reargued, but did not find it necessary to address whether
Congress was authorized to pass RFRA until then.234 Justice Souter cited his own opinion
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from Lukumi and reiterated his “serious doubts about the precedential value of
the Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence.”235 But despite his harsh criticism of
Smith, Justice Souter was unwilling to refute Smith entirely, as he said that “I am not now
prepared to join Justice O’Connor in rejecting it or the majority in assuming it to be
correct.”236
Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in full, but he wrote yet another
opinion, solely to refute Justice O’Connor. Justice Scalia claimed that “[t]he material that
the [O’Connor] dissent claims is at odds with Smith either has little to say about the issue
or is in fact more consistent with Smith than with the dissent's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause,” and then proceeds to rebut her arguments one by one.237 Only one
unlikely ally joined on to Justice Scalia’s opinion: frequent adversary Justice John Paul
Stevens.
Justice Stevens, too, wrote an opinion: the second-shortest (to Justice Breyer’s) of
the six Boerne opinions, but by far the widest-reaching; he would have struck down
RFRA facially, as applied to the States and to the Federal Government, without any need
to consider the federalism and separation of powers issues upon which Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion focused on. Justice Stevens’s view of the religion clauses was unique
among Supreme Court justices. Like other members of the Court’s liberal wing, Justice
Stevens had broad conception of the Establishment Clause, and rejected any government
preference of religion over irreligion. However, other justices with broad conceptions of
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the Establishment Clause, such as Justice William Brennan and Justice Thurgood
Marshall, tended to be the likeliest to require religious accommodations to neutral
laws.238 In contrast, Justice Stevens’s conception of Establishment Clause neutrality was
so stringent that he saw free exercise accommodations offered to the religious but not the
irreligious as an impermissible preference of religion. Therefore, Justice Stevens was the
only member of the court’s liberal wing to rule against the Sherbert Test in Smith, and, in
Boerne, was the only justice to join on to Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion which
defended the rationale behind the Smith decision.239 Justice Steven’s philosophy caused
him to see RFRA as an unconstitutional preference of religion over irreligion. At only
145 words, Justice Stevens’s Boerne opinion is worth replicating in full here:
“In my opinion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) is a ‘law
respecting an establishment of religion’ that violates the First Amendment to the
Constitution. If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a
museum or an art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an
exemption from the city ordinances that forbid an enlargement of the structure.
Because the landmark is owned by the Catholic Church, it is claimed that RFRA
gives its owner a federal statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally
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applicable, neutral civil law. Whether the Church would actually prevail under the
statute or not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no
atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion, as
opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment. Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U. S. 38, 52–55 (1985).”240
Justice Stevens was not the first to raise the potential Establishment Clause complications
of a statutory scheme or jurisprudence which privileges religiously motivated claims over
other claims of conscience. Indeed, Justice Potter Stewart addressed the potential
conflicts between accommodationism and the Establishment Clause in Sherbert itself,
saying that “[t]o require South Carolina to so administer its laws as to pay public money
to the appellant under the circumstances of this case is thus clearly to require the State to
violate the Establishment Clause as construed by this Court,” because the State denied
unemployment insurance to those who refused work on irreligious grounds, for example
“a mother unavailable for work on Saturdays because she was unable to get a
babysitter.”241 Justice Stewart, however, raised these concerns only to demonstrate his
opposition to the Court’s stringent Establishment Clause jurisprudence; he himself did
not subscribe to the position, because had a more lenient Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Justice O’Connor made a similar exemptions-based criticism of a strict
Establishment Clause in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985):
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“[i]t is difficult to square any notion of ‘complete neutrality,’ [citing Stevens’s
majority opinion in Wallace] with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that
government must sometimes exempt a religious observer from an otherwise
generally applicable obligation. A government that confers a benefit on an
explicitly religious basis is not neutral toward religion.242
Finally, during his 1990 confirmation hearings, then-Judge Souter recognized “what
ha[d] explicitly been recognized as the potential conflict between the [Sherbert and
Lemon] tests,” as Sherbert requires government official to make judgements on religion
in a way that the Lemon Test usually forbade.243
This tension between accommodationism and the Establishment Clause is less
pressing now that it was when Justices Stewart, O’Connor, or even Souter made their
remarks, however, because of the Court’s shifting Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Up until the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005), the Court generally held a jurisprudence of
strict neutrality, meaning that “neither a state nor the Federal Government […] can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”244 As
recently as 1961, two years before Sherbert, the Court ruled unanimously that no state or
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federal government “can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers.”245
Mandated neutrality between religion and irreligion began to decline during the
Burger Court; Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White, claimed that “[a]s its history abundantly shows […] nothing in the
Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and
irreligion.”246 Chief Justice Burger himself appeared conflicted on accommodationism’s
relationship to the Establishment Clause: in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), he wrote that
“[t]he Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of
citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause,” but he then
wrote in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana (1981) that “[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to
the exercise of religion.”247
During the Rehnquist Court, the tenet that religion could not be preferred over
irreligion became contested ground, and the strict separationist position found itself in
dissent more often than not. Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Stevens so closely agreed
on free exercise exemptions, believed that “there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s
favoring religion generally.”248 New Establishment Clause philosophies began to emerge:
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer held views of the Establishment Clause
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somewhere in between the Scalia/Rehnquist and Stevens positions, but none of the three
saw religious exemptions without analogous exemptions of conscience for non-believers
as violating the Establishment Clause.249 In sum, “sometimes the Court chooses to decide
cases on the principle that government cannot favor religion, and sometimes it does
not.”250
Given that the Court has shied away from demanding government neutrality to
religion as opposed to irreligion in recent years, it is unlikely that RFRA could be struck
down at the federal level. Some scholars have supported Justice Stevens’s view, such as
Marci Hamilton, who argued the case for the petitioner in Boerne v. Flores. Hamilton
wrote that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause both because it promotes religion
over irreligion and because its “resulting relationship between the government and
religious authority is one of excessive entanglement,” which violates the third prong of
the Lemon Test.251 But this position remains a fringe one, and unless the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence shifts dramatically, RFRA as currently written is
likely safe from the Court for the foreseeable future.
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Boerne was released on June 25, 1997, but it took until 2000 for Congress to
officially remove references to state and local governments and define “government” as
applying only to the US government and its territories in the federal code.252 Many states,
however, reacted quickly to Boerne. Before Boerne, only two states had enacted states
RFRAs which codified Sherbert Test accommodationism for free exercise claims under
state law: Rhode Island and Connecticut, both shortly before RFRA in 1993.253 In the
three years following Boerne, however, nine states implemented state RFRAs with
similar language to the federal RFRA. Illinois led the pack in 1997, followed by Alabama
and Florida in 1998.254 Arizona, South Carolina and Texas passed state RFRAs in
1999.255 Idaho, New Mexico and Oklahoma passed state RFRAs in 2000.256 A general
trend emerges from the states enacting these RFRAs; the first three (Connecticut, Rhode
Island and Illinois) were staunchly liberal, but starting in 1998 state RFRAs became more
desirable in conservative areas which had traditionally balked at accommodationism.
Seven of the eight states (including Florida) that passed RFRAs from 1998 to 2000 gave
their electoral votes to George W. Bush in 2000, and all eight voted for President Bush in
2004. These state level trends were matched at the federal level, as liberal interest groups
and congressmen began to fear the effects of accommodationism shortly after Boerne.
This ideological switch would only accelerate from 1998 onwards, as explained in
Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE RFRA COALITION FRACTURES, 1997-2012
Boerne was the beginning of the end for the RFRA coalition. During Boerne, The
ACLU filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Flores and RFRA. The brief argued that
Congress was within its Section 5 powers to pass RFRA largely because of established
cases dealing with voting rights, where the Court had consistently “upheld Congress'
power to prohibit electoral changes having the effect of causing a retrogression in
minority political power” and other minority protections.257 The ACLU’s argument that
RFRA was preventative cited the H.R. 2797 committee hearing from May 1992, where
[t]he Senate Committee likewise found that governmental bodies will rarely reveal their
intent to deliberately disadvantage religious minorities.”258 Again, the ACLU
championed the left-wing accommodationist position: that free exercise rights protect
“discrete and insular minorities” and not a blanket, equally applied fundamental right.
The ACLU brief makes no mention of fundamental rights, and it only mentions the Due
Process Clause once, awkwardly noting that Section 5 “is used equally to enforce the Due
Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and other incorporated rights” to avoid
what was increasingly becoming an obvious tension between the left-wing
accommodationists and the right-wing accommodationists.
On July 14, 1997, less than a month after the Boerne decision was released, the
House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution held an emergency
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hearing titled “Protecting Religious Freedom after Boerne v. Flores.”259 Like bill
hearings, the post-Boerne hearing hosted expert witnesses, including representatives from
the National Council of Churches, the American Jewish Congress, the Prison Fellowship
Ministries, and the U.S. Catholic Conference, as well as Douglas Laycock, who argued
for RFRA before the Court in Boerne.
The consensus of the hearing was that Boerne was wrongly decided; Oliver
Thomas of the National Council of Churches went so far as to say that “[a]s the Dred
Scott decision of a century ago was for African–Americans, so City of Boerne v. Flores is
for religious Americans today.”260 The expert witnesses agreed that a constitutional
amendment was not a wise path forward, and instead advocated more state RFRAs and
new federal legislation justified under the Spending Clause or Commerce Clause.261 The
Committee generally agreed: Congressman Bobby Scott (D-VA-3) said that
“reconfiguring the statute based on an Interstate Commerce clause or on the Spending
Clause are the credible options we have before us.”262 The hearing did not get into the
specifics of prospective legislation, however.
Despite this lack of specificity, there were hints in the witness’ testimony of
further tensions to come. Charles Colson of the Prison Fellowship Ministries lamented
that, after Boerne, “if we were to discharge someone or a church excommunicates
someone because of behavior which we believe was prohibited by scripture, but there
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were laws providing recourse to those aggrieved employees, we could find ourselves in a
position in which we could not exercise our own faith in our own organizations.”263 It
later became clear what Colson meant by the class of people “believe[d to be] prohibited
by scripture” when he said “[i]f you look at the language of Romer v. Evans in which
those motivated by religious feelings were accused of being bigoted in bringing their
religious convictions into public policy […] the religious community might be forgiven
for thinking that this Court has decided to create another class of people in those who are
people of faith.”264 Romer v. Evans (1996) had concerned a challenge to Colorado’s
Amendment 2, a 1992 ballot initiative which amended the state constitution to
“prohibit the state of Colorado and any of its political subdivisions from adopting
or enforcing any law or policy which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation, conduct, or relationships constitutes or entitles a person to
claim any minority or protected status, quota preferences, or discrimination.”265
Justice Kennedy’s 6-3 majority opinion in Romer ruled that Amendment 2 violated the
Equal Protection Clause, as “the amendment [wa]s at once too narrow and too broad,
identifying persons by a single trait and then denying them the possibility of protection
across the board.”266 Furthermore, the amendment was not designed to solve any real
policy problem, and therefore lacked a “rational relation to some independent and
legitimate legislative end.”267

263

Ibid, at 6.
Ibid, at 9.
265
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
266
Ibid, at 621.
267
Ibid, at 621.
264

94

Romer was the first major victory for gay rights at the Supreme Court level, and
marked the beginning of a tension between religious liberty and gay rights which still
lasts today.268 Among those organizations supporting the case against Amendment 2’s
constitutionality was the ACLU—a group which was conspicuously absent from the
House’s post-Boerne hearing.269 Indeed, there were no left-wing accommodationist
groups or scholars present at the hearing. The conversation was instead dominated by
right-wing accommodationists, including one group previously skeptical of RFRA: the
U.S. Catholic Conference. Mark Chopko still represented the Conference, and in contrast
to the hearings of five years prior, he was now one of the strongest proponents of finding
alternative means of codifying the Sherbert Test, saying “I think we need to study
avenues to pass uniform legislation. Many have been suggested in this testimony already.
I would remind you of them, and, again, emphasize the Spending Clause, the Commerce
Clause, privileges and immunities.”270
It did not take long for a bill derived from these proposals to be introduced in
Congress. On June 6, 1998, identical versions of the Religious Liberty Protection Act
were introduced to Congress: S. 2148 in the Senate and H.R. 4019 in the House. Like the
RFRAs of earlier in the decade, S.2148 and H.R. 4019 received bipartisan support. But
while the RFRAs’ base of support skewed left, the Religious Liberty Protection Act was
championed mostly by Republicans. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) sponsored S.2148, which had 4
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Republican and 2 Democratic co-sponsors, while Charles Canady (R-FL-12) sponsored
H.R. 4019 with 22 Democratic and 29 Republican cosponsors.271
The Religious Liberty Protection Act would have used the so-called “federal
funding hook” to apply the Sherbert Test to the many programs in state or local
government that received federal funding or could be connected to interstate
commerce.272273
SEC. 2. PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE.
(a) General Rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), a government shall not
substantially burden a person's religious exercise-(1) in a program or activity, operated by a government, that receives
Federal financial assistance; or
(2) in or affecting commerce with foreign nations, among the several
States, or with the Indian tribes; even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability.
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The exception to Section 2(a)’s provisions comes verbatim from RFRA; the burdening
law can stand if the government “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
RLPA also contained land use regulations, stating in Section 3(b) that:
“No government shall impose a land use regulation that—
(A) substantially burdens religious exercise, unless the burden is the least
restrictive means to prevent substantial and tangible harm to neighboring
properties or to the public health or safety;
(B) denies religious assemblies a reasonable location in the jurisdiction;
(C) excludes religious assemblies from areas in which nonreligious
assemblies are permitted.”
Again, Congress’ rationale was that the proliferation of federal funding in land use would
give it authority to pass such regulations on the states.
S. 2148 was never referred to committee, but H.R. 4019 went farther, receiving
subcommittee hearings on June 16th and July 14th, 1998. The June hearings’ expert
witnesses were primarily unaffiliated scholars: a mix of jurisdictionalists like Marci
Hamilton and accommodationists like Douglas Laycock.274 The July hearings were more
revealing, as they involved representatives of interest groups. Continuing a trend, these
groups, such the Prison Fellowship Ministries, the Southern Baptist Convention, the
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Center for Law and Religious Freedom, and Pat Robertson’s American Center for Law
and Justice, were all from the right wing of the RFRA coalition. These organizations
generally supported the Religious Liberty Protection Act, but the sentiment was not
unanimous. Some, most vociferously Michael Farris, President of the Home School Legal
Defense Association, expressed concern that, by making commercial impact prerequisite
for relief, RLPA would reduce religious liberty to the same status as “big business.”275
Most, however, recognized that while H.R. 4019 was not as ideal an accommodations
scheme as RFRA had been, it was still an improvement on RFRA only applying to the
federal government.276 Farris, like chief H.R. 4019 sponsor and subcommittee chairman
Charles Canady, believed that “the constitutional amendment [wa]s the best alternative”
to the Religious Liberty Protection Act, and stated that he had “never heard an
explanation of why it is not politically possible, except that most of the groups on the left
don't want it.”277
But not only did these “groups from the left” oppose a constitutional
amendment, they also opposed the Religious Liberty Protection Act. Following the H.R.
4019 hearings, and apparently motivated by concerns that “[s]everal witnesses during
hearings […] specifically stated their belief that RLPA could and should be used as a
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defense to civil rights claims based on gender, religion, sexual orientation, and marital
status,” meaning that “without any further amendments, RLPA could potentially
jeopardize certain civil rights claims,” the ACLU released a statement opposing RLPA.278
Several expert witnesses in the H.R. 4019 hearing, notably Douglas Laycock and the
American Jewish Congress’ Marc Stern, recommended against including civil rights
exemptions in RLPA such as those that had been advocated by the ACLU and some
liberal House Democrats. Stern had summarized the right-wing accommodationist view
on a civil rights carve-out when he said that “discrimination laws embody a particular
view of hotly contested moral issues [and…t]o say in RLPA that some moral views are
outside the use of polite discourse […] is in effect to use RLPA to say that religious
views ought not to be even heard.”279
The ACLU denouncement of RLPA gave seven examples of free exercise claims
challenges raised since RFRA that challenged civil rights. Six of the seven were
challenges to anti-discrimination housing laws, the main civil rights concerns raised by
left-wing accommodationist Congressmen Bobby Scott (D-VA-3) and Jerrold Nadler (DNY-8) during the H.R. 4019 hearings.280 But the article went even further, noting that
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“[d]efendants in civil rights cases have also raised religious liberty defenses in cases
involving such characteristics as race or sexual orientation and in contexts ranging from
educational institutions to employment.” Here, again, they cited five cases, including one
Supreme Court case, Bob Jones University v. United States (1983). Remarkably, the five
cases that the ACLU gave as examples of challenges to racial or sexual orientation civil
rights were all from the 1980’s—in other words, before the passage of RFRA.281
The fascinating part of the ACLU’s opposition to the Religious Liberty Protection
Act is that RLPA went no farther than RFRA in any way, shape, or form; any claim
which would succeed under RLPA would also have succeeded under RFRA, as RLPA’s
version of the Sherbert Test came verbatim from RFRA and had no broader applications.
The difference between the two bills was not in policy, but rather that it took the ACLU
until the mid-1990’s to realize the full implications of accommodationism. Not only was
RFRA’s accommodationism, with universalized strict scrutiny for all free exercise
claims, benefitting members of well-represented religions far more than it was benefitting
religious minorities, but free exercise claims were now being made that harmed other
discrete and insular minority groups. Left-wing accommodationist groups like the ACLU
could not have anticipated these effects under their own religious liberty framework,
because their framework gave accommodations only to the religious practices of minority
religious groups, who could not wield enough power to enforce their will through the
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political process. But free exercise accommodationism always had the potential to
encroach on other rights; there had always been religious liberty claims which had the
potential to harm others. For example, the Supreme Court had seen religious liberty
challenges to drug restrictions,282 minimum wage laws,283 business permit laws,284 traffic
laws,285 laws regulating polygamy,286 and child labor laws.287 These free exercise claims
failed under a jurisdictional court or statutory scheme; but under RFRA, RLPA or any
other accommodationist system, rights would inevitably collide.
H.R. 4019 died in committee, but Congressman Canady came back with a new
RLPA, H.R. 1691 (or the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999) and introduced it to
the floor on May 5, 1999. The partisan divide in accommodationism had shifted even
further in the past year: while H.R. 4019 had 22 Democratic and 29 Republican cosponsors, H.R. 1691 had 30 Republican and only 9 Democratic cosponsors.288 The very
same day H.R. 1691 was introduced, the ACLU released a letter stating that it opposed
the new RLPA unless it was amended to “make clear that RLPA has no effect on state or
local civil rights laws, thus leaving in place both the rights of civil rights plaintiffs and
the existing constitutional exception from civil rights laws for the ministerial functions of
religious organizations and the numerous statutory exceptions for religious organizations
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and small landlords.”289 At the House committee hearing on H.R. 1691, ACLU counsel
Christopher Anders acknowledged “the ACLU's historical position favoring stronger
protection of religious exercise even against neutral, generally applicable governmental
restrictions,” but expressed concern “that some courts may turn RLPA's shield for
religious exercise into a sword against civil rights,” particularly in the arena of housing
discrimination.290 On July 1, H.R. 1691 passed the House Judiciary Committee.
A fortnight later, on July 15, 1999, Jerrold Nadler (D-NY-8) proposed a civil
rights carve-out to H.R. 1691, as recommended by the ACLU. House Amendment 284
would have prevented all persons, save small landlords, religious institutions and small
business owners, from filing free exercise claims for cases dealing with housing and
employment discrimination.291 House Democrats supported the amendment 174-30, but
the majority-party Republicans opposed the amendment 15-204. The Amendment failed
190-234, with ten members abstaining. Less than an hour later, H.R. 1691 passed the
House 306-118. Democrats narrowly supported the bill, 107-97, while Republicans
overwhelmingly supported it 199-20. H.R. 1691 was not referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee until November 19, 1999, where it died quietly in committee. Senator Hatch
introduced yet another RLPA in February 2000, but it received only one cosponsor and
did not even make it to committee.292
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Instead, the efforts of religious liberty proponents channeled toward a new bill:
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. RLUIPA was
something of a compromise, as it combined protections for one favorite subject of rightwing accommodationists (land use protections) with one favorite subject of left-wing
accommodationists (protections for prisoners), thereby avoiding broader protections
which would have drawn out the tension between the two camps. Senator Hatch and
Congressman Canady introduced matching versions of RLUIPA on July 13, 2000: S.
2869 and H.R. 4862.293 Senator Hatch’s opening statement on S. 2869 emphasized that
its “narrowly focused” nature was the result of a “consensus approach” necessitated by
“concerns […] regarding the scope of S. 2081 [RLPA].”294 In other words, just seven
years after RFRA, free exercise accommodationism had been revealed as a partisan issue.
RLUIPA was narrowly focused, and like RFRA, simply and succinctly
constructed. Section 2 contained the land use language, mandating that “No government
shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution”
unless the regulation passes the same version of the Sherbert Test used in RFRA and
RLPA; that being that the challenged regulation must be both “in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest” and “the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” Section 3 included the protections for
institutionalized persons; that “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
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religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in
section 2 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997), even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the burden passes the same
version of the Sherbert Test.
Both the land use accommodations in Section 2 and the institutionalized
persons accommodations found in Section 3 used the federal funding hook and the
Commerce Clause to avoid any Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Both sections apply
in cases where “the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives
Federal financial assistance” and where “the substantial burden affects, or removal of that
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several
States, or with Indian tribes.” The land use section also applies in one additional set of
cases; those in which “the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land
use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has
in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make,
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.”
Because of its compromising nature, RLUIPA sailed through the legislative
process quickly and easily. S. 2869 passed the Senate on unanimous consent the morning
of July 27, and then, remarkably, passed the House on unanimous consent later that same
day. On September 22, 1999, President Clinton signed S. 2869 into law, and it became
Public Law No: 106-274.295 RLUIPA is, as of this date, the last major bipartisan free
exercise accommodations bill passed through Congress.
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RLUIPA was challenged in Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005), but the Court held that
RLUIPA was both within Congress’ spending and Commerce Clause powers and not
violative of the Establishment Clause.296 All nine justices joined Justice Ginsburg’s
unanimous opinion of the Court. Soon after Cutter, President George W. Bush filled two
Supreme Court vacancies, appointing Judges John Roberts and Samuel Alito to replace
the seats of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.
Judge Roberts’s confirmation hearings were from September 12-15, 2005.297 The
hearings were thorough, but free exercise accommodationism was apparently not a
concern of the Democratic Senators on the committee. All of the religious jurisprudence
questions levelled at Roberts related to the Establishment Clause: he was asked if “the
separation of church and state is absolute,” about the Lemon Test, and about the recent
challenge to “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance in Elk Grove v. Newdow (2004),
but never was he asked about his views on accommodationism.298 Judge Roberts only
mentioned accommodationism once, and unprompted, when answering a question about
the tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Roberts said:
“There is a tension of sorts between the Establishment Clause, on the one hand,
and the Free Exercise Clause on the other, and the Court’s cases in recent years
have tried to consider when is an accommodation for religious belief—when does
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that go too far and become an establishment of religion? The Court has a case on
its docket coming up.”299
This case, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006), did come before the Court for its November 2005 term, two months into the new
Roberts Court and two months before Alito’s confirmation.300 In one of Chief Justice
Roberts’s first majority opinions, he wrote for a unanimous Court that RFRA was
constitutional as applied to the federal government. Even Justice Stevens joined the
majority opinion, as his Establishment Clause concerns had apparently been placated by
RFRA’s newly limited post-Boerne form.
Judge Samuel Alito’s hearing, held January 9-13, 2006, had even fewer religious
questions than the new Chief Justice’s had; again, he was not asked about his views on
free exercise accommodations even once.301 As in the Roberts hearing, the sparse
questioning on religion that Alito did get concerned the Establishment Clause,
particularly religion in the public square and prayer at public school graduation.302 The
hearings of the two George W. Bush appointees provided a sharp contrast from those of
his fathers’ appointees only fifteen years prior, but such was the shifting politicization of
free exercise accommodations.
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Following RLUIPA, there were no major religious liberty bills proposed by
Congress for over a decade. Several bills were proposed, but they were “red meat” for the
base, designed to send a point but with little hope of passage into law. After the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2002-2003 rulings in Elk Grove v. Newdow that found the
Pledge of Allegiance’s affirmation of one nation “under God” to violate the
Establishment Clause, conservative Republicans introduced three 2003 bills to counter
the decision: Congressman Ron Paul’s (R-TX-14) H.R. 1547, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 2003, Congressman Chip Pickering’s (R-MS-3) H.R. 3190, the
Safeguarding Our Religious Liberties Act (2003), and Senator Wayne Allards’s (R-CO)
S.B. 1558, the Religious Liberties Restoration Act.303 In response to Newdow, the bills
expressly opposed the “separation of church and state” ideal, particularly regarding the
Pledge of Allegiance, the National Motto (“In God We Trust”), and public displays of the
Ten Commandments. All three bills sought to restrict federal court jurisdiction; H.R.
1547 denied federal district courts jurisdiction over any religious freedom claim
originating in a State or Federal statute, while H.R. 3190 and S.B. 1558 removed cases
concerning the display of the Ten Commandments and the use of the word ‘God’ in the
Pledge of Allegiance and the National Motto from the jurisdiction of all Federal courts
but the Supreme Court. None of the three bills received a committee hearing.304 There
were also a series of Constitution Restoration Acts in 2004, 2005, and 2006.305 These
bills would have removed jurisdiction over any challenge “against an element of Federal,
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State, or local government, or against an officer of Federal, State, or local government
(whether or not acting in official personal capacity), by reason of that element's or
officer's acknowledgement of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or
government” from any federal court, including the Supreme Court. Of the five
Constitution Restoration Acts, all introduced by Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) or
Congressman Robert Aderholt (R-AL-4), only 2004’s H.R. 3799 reached the committee
hearing stage, and even H.R. 3799 did not receive a committee vote. These 2003-2006
bills shared much of the language of accommodationism, but were far narrower in nature,
and received almost no Democratic support.
By 2010, the old RFRA coalition no longer existed. Increasing party
polarization meant that the Republican Party was now closely aligned with right-wing
accommodationism, and the Democratic Party was now closely aligned with left-wing
accommodationism. The vast majority of the conservative Southern Democrats who had,
for example, supported Harry Reid’s amendment to keep prisoners outside of RFRA’s
protections had since retired, been defeated by Republican challengers or switched
parties. On the flipside, the Republican Party had drifted rightwards. Arlen Specter, a
pro-choice moderate and one of the staunchest Republican proponents of passing RFRA,
crossed over to join the Democratic Party in April 2009.306 Not only was free exercise
now more politicized than ever, it was now also more partisan than ever. These divides
had stayed under the surface during the first decade of the new millennium, but
circumstances would soon bring the religious liberty divide to the political forefront.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE HOBBY LOBBY ERA, 2012-PRESENT
Accommodationism as such laid fallow as a hotbed political issue from RFRA’s
passage in until March 2010, when President Barack Obama signed H.R. 3590, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the ACA).307 The act was highly
controversial in its own right, but it also instigated free exercise claims under RFRA
resulting from the ACA’s individual health insurance mandate. Most of the ACA’s
beneficiaries are covered through employer-provided healthcare insurance plans, which
subsidize the costs of treatments selected by the Department of Health and Human
Services’ Health Resource and Service Administration.
The HRSA’s list of drugs to be covered by the ACA contained 20 female
contraceptives, some of which were considered abortifacient by members of certain
religious denominations. David Green, the founder and CEO of Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., was one such person; his evangelical Christian beliefs led him to see four of these
contraceptives, specifically emergency contraceptives and intrauterine devices, as
abortifacients. Hobby Lobby was a closely held, for-profit corporation with an expressly
Christian mission statement. 308 All churches and institutions organizations were
exempted from the ACA’s requirements, as were all other non-profit organizations, and
all employers with fewer than 50 employees, but for-profit corporations like Hobby
Lobby were forced to subsidize any and all of the treatments authorized by the HRSA or

307

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
According to Hobby Lobby’s website, the company is committed to “Honoring the Lord in all we do by
operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.” Accordingly, all Hobby Lobby
stores are closed on Sundays. Hobby Lobby. "Our Story." http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story.
308

109

else be penalized by paying either a daily fine or higher wages and tax as compensation
to the workers. Therefore, Green claimed that Hobby Lobby’s compliance with a
healthcare insurance plan that subsidized drugs with effects violated the corporation’s
core religious beliefs, was substantial burden on Hobby Lobby’s free exercise rights, and
was therefore a violation of RFRA. In 2012, Green filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on Hobby Lobby’s behalf.
Hobby Lobby’s claim was completely anathema to left-wing
accommodationism. Not only were Hobby Lobby’s claimed beliefs not those of a
religious minority, as its stated belief system was mainstream Christian, but no for-profit
corporation could claim protections as a discrete and insular minority group. Pierce, the
case cited by Carolene’s Footnote Four as an example of when strict scrutiny should be
applied to religious minorities, stated that “corporations cannot claim for themselves the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and, in general, no person in any
business has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of
proper power by the State.”309 A for-profit coalition can also never be discrete and insular
in the way that a religious nonprofit can: a religious institution can, and often does, hire
employees only from its own denomination, while for-profit corporations are prevented
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 from hiring based on religion. Additionally, a corporation
is not human, which raises the more philosophical question of whether it can really have
religious beliefs as such. For right-wing wing accommodationists, however, Hobby
Lobby’s argument was colorable. If free exercise is an assertive fundamental right to
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action, irrespective of the democratic process, then for-profit corporations could quite
plausibly exercise religion. Consider, for example, freedom of speech or freedom of the
press, which are nearly universally considered to be universal, monolithic fundamental
rights much in the way that right-wing accommodationists consider free exercise to be.310
For-profit corporations receive the same free speech and freedom of press restrictions that
individuals do, with their restrictions dictated by time, place and manner restrictions
rather than personhood status. Free speech and freedom of the press protections are often
applied to for-profit corporations: see, for example, the landmark cases New York Times
Company v. Sullivan (1964) and New York Times Company v. United States (1971).311
Hobby Lobby’s claim, however, would depend on personhood status, as RFRA
states that “Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the government’s
restriction passes the Sherbert Test.312 RFRA’s Definitions section, Section 5, was no
help; it defines “government,” “state,” “demonstrates,” and “exercise of religion” but not
“person.” Likewise, RLPA did not define “person,” and RLUIPA defined “claimant” as
“a person raising a claim or defense under this chapter,” but did not define “person.”313
It is highly likely that most of RFRA’s proponents did not expect the bill to
apply to for-profit corporations. The issue was never explicitly discussed in any of the
“Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from
infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.” (Emphasis mine). Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
311
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RFRA, RLPA or RLUIPA hearings—itself a sign that the issue was not considered—but
even the statements of right-wing accommodationists suggested that for-profit
corporations were ineligible for free exercise accommodations. It was generally accepted,
especially by right-wing accommodationists, that RFRA applied to religious institutions.
Douglas Laycock wrote in 1994 that “RFRA protects the rights of any ‘person,’ and
under the terms of the Dictionary Act, this term includes organizations.”314 He then wrote
that:
“a religious institution, such as a church, synagogue, school, or social service
agency, should not have to prove that every detail of its operation has an
independent religious motivation. Rather, it should be enough to prove that the
institution as a whole has a primary religious motivation and that the government
is burdening or interfering with an integral part of the institution's operation.”315
(emphasis mine).
Laycock’s examples of religious institutions, as well as his requirement of primary
religious motivation, would seem to preclude for-profit corporations from being religious
institutions. This sentiment was echoed in Laycock’s prepared statement from the July
1998 RLPA, which said that “land use regulation has a disproportionate impact on
religious organizations, because they are not-for-profit organizations, often operating on
limited operational budgets and with little or no capital”—implying that religious

314

Laycock, Douglas, and Oliver S. Thomas. "Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act." Texas
Law Review 73, no. 2 (1994), at 234. (emphasis mine).
315
Ibid, at 234.

112

organizations are always not-for-profit.316 In the same H.R. 4019 hearing, Marc Stern
stated that “RLPA would in theory apply to all forms of discrimination by religious
institutions and religious individuals,” mentioning no other classes of “person.”317
Hobby Lobby’s case became a news sensation almost immediately, and
conservative Republicans championed its cause. On January 30, 2012, before the District
Court’s opinion was released, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) introduced S. 2043, the
Religious Freedom Restoration act of 2012.318 Four days later, Congressman Steve
Chavet (R-OH-1) introduced an identical House version.319 These RFRAs of 2012 broke
new ground, as they were the first effort to grant exemptions based on religious
objections to specific policies, rather than a general test for exemptions. In the RFRA of
2012’s case, this policy was contraception coverage. Section 3(d) of the bill stated that
the ACA shall not “require any individual or entity to offer, provide, or purchase
coverage for a contraceptive or sterilization service, or related education or counseling, to
which that individual or entity is opposed on the basis of religious belief.” The RFRA of
2012’s purpose was mainly symbolic; even in the Republican House it did not receive a
committee hearing or vote. But it the RFRA of 2012 did suggest the increasing extent to
which free exercise was seen as a political issue, which could affect concrete policies on
a major scale, rather than a series of random, uncoordinated exemptions.
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Regardless, it now fell to the courts to decide how broad the original RFRA’s
sweep was. On November 19, 2012, District Court Chief Judge Joe Heaton released his
opinion, which rejected Hobby Lobby’s claim.320 While the Dictionary Act does state that
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates
otherwise […] the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals,” Judge Heaton found that the context of RFRA clearly precluded for-profit
corporations from claiming free exercise rights.321 He said that:
“business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief
systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not
pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions
separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.
Religious exercise is, by its nature, one of those ‘purely personal’ matters
referenced in Bellotti which is not the province of a general business
corporation.”322
Additionally, Chief Judge Heaton ruled that there was no substantial burden on Green
through his role as owners of Hobby Lobby.323 Green and Hobby Lobby appealed this
decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the District Court’s
opinion on June 27, 2013.324 Judge Timothy Tymkovich wrote the en banc decision for

320

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
1 U.S.C. § 1.
322
Hobby Lobby (W.D. Okla. 2012), at 1291.
323
Ibid, at 1293-1296.
324
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114 – Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit (2013).
321

114

the Circuit Court, which found that “the supposedly preexisting distinction between nonprofit, religious corporations and for-profit, secular corporations” did not apply to RFRA
because “Congress did not exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA's protections.”325
The court’s opinion stated that, because Congress often excludes certain types of
“person” as defined by the Dictionary Act but did not do so in RFRA, Congress intended
RFRA’s protections to apply to all classes of “person” as defined by the Dictionary Act.
This directly rejected the government’s argument that RFRA’s context clearly implied
that the act applied only to individuals or nonprofit religious institutions: a context based
on definitions from a general statutory scheme including the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the National Labor Relations Act and the ACA itself, which exempted “religious
employers” from the individual mandate and stipulated that an institution must be
nonprofit to qualify as a religious employer.326 In applying the Sherbert Test, the Circuit
Court found that while there was a compelling government interest for the individual
mandate, the contraceptive mandate as currently constructed was not sufficiently
“narrowly tailored” because “Congress is quite capable of narrowing the scope of a
statutory entitlement or affording a type of statutory exemption when it wants to,” as it
had done for nonprofit religious institutions.327 The government appealed the Tenth
Circuit’s opinion to the Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari. Hobby Lobby’s
case was consolidated with a similar case from Conestoga Wood Specialties, whose
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claim had been denied at the District and Circuit Court levels. The Court heard oral
argument for Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. on March 25, 2014.328
There were a whopping 84 amicus curiae briefs submitted for Hobby Lobby.
Fifty-nine of the briefs supported Hobby Lobby’s claim, 23 opposed the claim, and two
were neutral. The composition of the groups supporting and opposing Hobby Lobby’s
claim was almost purely partisan, revealing the complete fracture between the left-wing
accommodationists and right-wing accommodationists that the corporate free exercise
question had wrought. A coalition of 16 Senators and 72 members of Congress submitted
a brief in favor of Hobby Lobby; all 16 Senators and 70 of the 72 representatives were
Republican.329 Interestingly, these congressmen’s amicus brief did not claim that
Congress had specifically intended to include for-profit corporations under RFRA’s
protections, but rather argued that “Congress expressed its intent to protect against any
burden on religious exercise—no matter the individual or entity burdened—that might
arise in future, unforeseen circumstances.”330 In contrast, 19 Democratic Senators and 91
Democratic Congressmen, but not a single Republican in the House or Senate, submitted
briefs against Hobby Lobby, claiming that “Congress could not have anticipated, and did
not intend, such a broad and unprecedented expansion of RFRA.”331 Twenty states
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submitted a joint amicus brief in favor of Hobby Lobby; only five of which (Colorado,
Florida, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) voted for President Obama in 2008 or 2012,
and only one of which, Colorado, voted for Hillary Clinton in 2016.332 Sixteen states
submitted an amicus brief against Hobby Lobby; all 16 voted for President Obama in
2008 and 2012, and only one, Iowa, voted for President Trump in 2016.333 The left-wing
accommodationist interest groups including the ACLU, overwhelmingly opposed Hobby
Lobby’s claim, fearing that a victory for Hobby Lobby would give precedent for
religiously justified discrimination.334
On June 30, 2014, the Court released its decision for Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., which affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s ruling and granted Hobby Lobby’s claim
by a 5-4 margin. Justice Alito wrote the opinion of the Court, which was joined by his
four fellow Republican appointees: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Thomas. Unlike the Circuit Court opinion, Justice Alito suggested
that the owners of Hobby Lobby, rather than Hobby Lobby itself, might be the aggrieved
party; he wrote that “owners of the companies [did not] forfei[t] all RFRA protection
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when they decided to organize their businesses as corporations” and that the “terms of
RFRA make it perfectly clear that Congress did not discriminate in this way against men
and women who wish to run their businesses as for-profit corporations.”335
Regardless, Justice Alito found that RFRA applied to for-profit corporations
because there was “nothing in RFRA that suggests a congressional intent to depart from
the Dictionary Act definition.”336 Justice Alito noted that the Court had consistently
applied RFRA to nonprofit religious organizations, for example in Lukumi and O Centro,
and that the for-profit status of Hobby Lobby was irrelevant because the Court had
previously “entertained the free-exercise claims of individuals who were attempting to
make a profit as retail merchants,” for example in Braunfeld.337 Justice Alito therefore
applied the Sherbert Test as mandated by RFRA, and, like the Circuit Court, found that
the “HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less
restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their
religious beliefs,” because nonprofit religious organizations were exempted from the very
mandates that Hobby Lobby claimed as burdensome.338 The Court therefore upheld
Hobby Lobby’s (or Green’s) claim to an exemption from providing the four ACAcovered contraceptives that it believed objectionable.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a scathing dissent, joined by her three
fellow Democratic appointees: Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and
Hobby Lobby, at Supreme Court Reporter 2759. At the time of this thesis’ publication, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. has not yet been published in the preliminary print of the United States Reports, so
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Justice Elena Kagan.339 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent first claimed that the context of RFRA
clearly indicated that RFRA was not intended to apply to for-profit corporations, and that
the Dictionary Act definition of “person” was therefore inapplicable. She supported this
claim first by noting that the Court had never applied free exercise rights to a for-profit
corporation, likely because of the self-evident fact that corporations themselves “have no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no desires.”340 To Justice Ginsburg, the reasoning
behind including religious nonprofit organizations, but not for-profit corporations, under
RFRA’s protections is “hardly obscure”: “religious organizations exist to foster the
interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith,” which is “[n]ot so of forprofit corporations.”341 Even if Hobby Lobby had qualified as a person under RFRA,
however, Justice Ginsburg would have rejected its claims. She found no substantial
burden, as Hobby Lobby was not required to purchase any contraceptives or make
decisions on the purchase thereof.342 Finally, in a rare jurisdictionalist-sounding point,
Justice Ginsburg notes the free-rider problem that Hobby Lobby causes; the women
employed by Hobby Lobby would still receive their contraceptives, but the government,
and therefore other taxpayers, would pay.343 In her concluding sections, Justice Ginsburg
asks the soon-to-be-realized question:
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“Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with
religiously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend to
employers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs,
including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain
Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among
others)? According to counsel for Hobby Lobby, “each one of these cases . . .
would have to be evaluated on its own . . . apply(ing) the compelling interest-least
restrictive alternative test.” Not much help there for the lower courts bound by
today’s decision.”344
These claims presented a problem far beyond policy for Justice Ginsburg, who then made
a closing argument reminiscent of Chief Justice Morrison Waite in Reynolds, Justice
Owen Roberts in Cantwell, Justice Scalia in Smith, and jurisdictionalists throughout the
last 150 years of Supreme Court religious liberty jurisprudence:
“There is an overriding interest, I believe, in keeping the courts “out of the
business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims,” Lee, 455
U. S., at 263, n. 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), or the sincerity with
which an asserted religious belief is held. Indeed, approving some religious
claims while deeming others unworthy of accommodation could be “perceived as
favoring one religion over another,” the very “risk the Establishment Clause was
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designed to preclude.” Ibid. The Court, I fear, has ventured into a minefield by its
immoderate reading of RFRA.”
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was shared by nearly all left-wing accommodationists, and
nearly all Democrats. Hobby Lobby became an instant wedge issue for the 2014 midterm
elections, with Democrats and left-wing accommodationists framing the decision as
opening up new possibilities for discrimination against women and, potentially, other
groups.345 Jurisdictionalism began to have a minor resurgence in the public discourse, as
members of the political left saw its utility for fighting Hobby Lobby-like claims. In
contrast, right-wing accommodationist groups, now comfortably aligned with the
Republican Party, framed Hobby Lobby as nothing more than a defense of religious
liberty, an unquestionable good in the abstract. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) “applauded”
the Hobby Lobby decision, saying that “the Religious Freedom Restoration Act could not
have been clearer in saying religious liberty of all Americans must be equally protected
and not unnecessarily burdened.”346
The RFRA coalition was now truly broken. For the first time since the bill’s
passage, left-wing accommodationists and Democrats did not support it as interpreted by
the Court. RFRA always had the potential to apply like a universal, fundamental right;
left-wing accommodationists’ failure to see that strict scrutiny is not always as it was
applied by the pre-Smith Court was their ultimate downfall. Two weeks after Hobby
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Lobby was released, now-Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), the original sponsor of
RFRA, spoke on the Senate floor:
“As the author of the bill, I can say again with absolute certainty that the Supreme
Court got the Hobby Lobby case dead wrong. When we wrote RFRA back in
1993, we did so to protect that which individuals with strong religious beliefs had
always enjoyed—the presumption that they should be able to exercise their
religious beliefs without interference from the government. But the Court took
that protection and misapplied it to for-profit companies that exist for the purpose
of benefiting from the open market.”347
RFRA is dead; long live RFRA.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
Of course, Hobby Lobby was not the end of discussions over RFRA or free
exercise accommodationism in general. To the contrary, it brought free exercise
accommodations to the national fore in a way they had not been since at least before
RFRA’s passage, and perhaps ever. Free exercise accommodationism was now, for the
first time, a charged, partisan, political issue. In June 2015, the ACLU announced that it
now opposed RFRA in its current form, emphasizing its belief that RFRA was initially
passed to support “vulnerable religious minorities.”348
On July 9, 2014, Democrats introduced two matching bills, both entitled the
Protect Women’s Health From Corporate Interference Act of 2014: S. 2578 in the Senate
and H.R. 5051 in the House.349 These bills would have effectively overturned Hobby
Lobby’s narrow decision by preventing any employer that provides group health plans for
its employees from denying coverage of any approved treatment, notwithstanding any
other federal law. S. 2578 was cosponsored by 45 Democrats, 1 Independent, and no
Republicans; H.R. 5051 had 162 cosponsors, all Democrats. H.R. 5051 died in committee
in a Republican House, while S. 2578 was filibustered, with all Democrats save Majority
Leader Harry Reid, but only 3 Republicans, voting for cloture.
Hobby Lobby engendered renewed interest in state RFRAs in conservative states.
Only five states had passed RFRAs in the 12 years between RLUIPA and Hobby
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Lobby.350 In the two years following Hobby Lobby, however, there was a new wave of
State RFRAs passed exclusively by conservative states: Kansas and Kentucky in 2013,
Mississippi in 2014, and Arkansas and Indiana in 2015.351 These RFRAs were
fundamentally different than the pre-Hobby Lobby state RFRAs, as they explicitly
allowed closely held for-profit corporations like Hobby Lobby to file suit under their
protections. Some pushed even further: Indiana’s RFRA stated that even private person
and entities, and not only government entities, could burden religion under its statute, so
civil suits could contain RFRA claims. The Obama White House explicitly denounced
Indiana’s RFRA.352 So different was this new wave of RFRAs that even states that had
already passed RFRAs, like Arizona and Missouri, considered passing broader laws:
Arizona’s made it all the way to the governor’s desk in 2014.353
The Hobby Lobby precedent still stands in full. But the ACA contraceptive
mandate was only the first of many areas from which for-profit businesses would claim
exemption. The second new wave of accommodationism claims followed Obergefell v.
Hodges (2015), the case that established a Constitutional right for gay couples to
marry.354 Following Obergefell, there were a number of high-profile cases of for-profit
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businesses refusing to serve gay couples: most famously a Colorado cake shop that
refused to bake cakes for gay weddings, claimed a free exercise burden, and had its claim
denied.355 In addition, a new controversy arose: government officials who, when working
in their official capacities, refused to perform certain actions on the basis of their
religious beliefs. Kim Davis, the county clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, became a
national celebrity after she refused to issue marriage licenses to gay couples, was ordered
to issue the licenses by a federal District Court, continued to refuse issuing the licenses,
and was jailed for contempt of court. Democrats denounced Davis, but many prominent
Republicans, including presidential candidates Ted Cruz, Mike Huckabee, Rand Paul and
Rick Santorum, expressed support for Davis’ claim. 356
Less than a month after Obergefell, Republicans introduced two identical versions
of a new religious liberty bill, the First Amendment Defense Act.357 The Senate version
of FADA, S. 1598, was cosponsored by 37 of the 54 Republican Senators, and not a
single Democrat, while 171 of the 247 House Republicans and only one House
Democrat, Dan Lipinski (D-IL-3) cosponsored H.R. 2802. FADA was a direct response
to Obergefell; it mandated that the federal government shall not discriminate against a
person “on the basis that such person believes or acts in accordance with a religious
belief or moral conviction that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one
man and one woman, or that sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage.”
The bill’s narrowness was striking: like the RFRA of 2012, it granted religious
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accommodations based on religious objection to one specific issue, rather than on
religious objection to any policy. But also striking was its breadth: FADA defined
discrimination as altering tax treatment in any way, reducing or terminating any grant,
loan, contract, or employment, or “otherwise discriminat[ing]” against. It included federal
employees like Kim Davis in its protections, and protected not only their belief but also
all of their religiously motivated conduct. FADA used the Dictionary Act definition of
“person” from Hobby Lobby, therefore including for-profit corporations in its scope.
Neither version of FADA made it far in the legislative process, but FADA was
incorporated into the 2016 Republican Party platform, which stated that “We endorse the
First Amendment Defense Act, Republican legislation in the House and Senate which
will bar government discrimination against individuals and businesses for acting on the
belief that marriage is the union of one man and one woman.”358 FADA’s message,
especially only three years after the RFRA of 2012, was abundantly clear. Free exercise
accommodationism would now be used as an organized tool for, or against, specific
public policies, and not only as a blanket test for all claimants and against all policies.
The first real post-Hobby Lobby policy struggle was gay marriage: not only was
there FADA, but within days of Obergefell, state legislators in Arkansas, Florida,
Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah and Wisconsin drafted bills that would subvert the
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Court’s ruling on free exercise grounds.359 The next source of controversy is unknown,
but the breadth of religious belief is such that virtually no policy area is safe from
challenge on religious grounds.
Such is the state of religious liberty discourse in the United States: fiercely
partisan, results-based, and largely devoid of thoughtful discussions on the appropriate
ideological frameworks to utilize. Religious liberty has become something of a
buzzword, but neither Democrats nor Republicans have put forward a cohesive and
coherent philosophy for judging free exercise claims that is independent of context. This
is likely because political incentives reward vagueness, particularly for Republicans.
Religious liberty, in the abstract, is immensely popular. An AP-NORC poll from
December 2015 found that 82% of Americans believe religious liberty protections are
necessary for Christians, and for each religion featured in the poll, at least 61% of
respondents thought that particular religion needed protections.360 The same poll found
only 55% of Americans think government is doing a good job at protecting religious
liberty, a steep drop from the 75% that AP-NORC found when asking the same question
in 2011.361 When asked about actual, specific religious cases, however, Americans are far
less supportive of free exercise. A 2014 NBC poll found that 53% of Americans thought
that employers like Hobby Lobby should not be exempted from providing healthcare
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treatments to which they object, and only 41% thought they should be exempted.362
Likewise, a 2015 ABC News/Washington Post poll found 63% of Americans thought
Kim Davis should be forced to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, compared to
33% opposed, with only 6% undecided.363 Republicans do well to support religious
liberty in the abstract, making statements such as claiming that Democrats’ “ongoing
attempts to compel individuals, businesses, and institutions of faith to transgress their
beliefs are part of a misguided effort to undermine religion and drive it from the public
square.”364 Democrats, meanwhile, currently stand on the defensive regarding religious
liberty. RFRA and state-level accommodationism statutes cover all the accommodations
that left-wing accommodationists want, but they go too far; it is too much religious
liberty, not too little, that Democrats fear.
This brings up another aspect of accommodationist’s development: the
Democratic Party is now completely aligned with left-wing accommodationism, while
the Republican Party is completely aligned with right-wing accommodationism. This was
not always so: Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), one of the main proponents of RFRA, was
a moderate, pro-choice Republican, while the two Senators who joined Jesse Helms in
opposing RFRA were conservative, pro-life Democrats who held right-wing
accommodationist views: Robert Byrd (D-WV) and Harlan Mathews (D-TN). In an
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increasingly polarized Congress, religious liberty laws are likely to stay sharply partisan
for the near future, and prospects for consensus are dim.
The Supreme Court, too, deserves some of the blame for today’s lack of clear free
exercise dialogue; from 1963 to 1990, it was ineffectively, incompletely, and
inconsistently rationalized. Carolene remains an immensely popular precedent, and strict
scrutiny is found across nearly all fields of constitutional law. But even though it has
been widely accepted, the reasons for why and when a court should apply strict scrutiny
continue to be both crucially important and stubbornly opaque. The difference between
protections for discrete and insular minorities and protections of a universal, fundamental
right is not merely theoretical, as the left wing of the RFRA coalition painfully
discovered in RFRA’s second decade.
Ultimately, the only stable solution to the current free exercise turmoil is a return
to jurisdictionalism. Accommodationism, whether of the right-wing or left-wing varieties,
has two fatal flaws: firstly, it is inherently volatile and difficult to predict, providing
much more confusion to lower courts and the future Court. The Court’s free exercise
jurisprudence of 1963-1990 provides ample proof of this confusion; and while the postHobby Lobby RFRA claims so far have all been against liberal policies, it is quite likely
that, sooner or later, there will be a successful, organized, free exercise exemptions
campaign against a conservative policy. Secondly, accommodationism requires, by
definition, the courts to determine the legitimacy of a claimant’s religious beliefs, in
direct contradiction to Cantwell’s dictum that a state actor’s “determin[ation whether] the
cause is not a religious one” violates the Free Exercise Clause. Such determinations are
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likely to favor popular and familiar religions: those religions least in need of
accommodation. Hobby Lobby has the potential to make this judgement regarding the
legitimacy of religious beliefs even more difficult. Hobby Lobby now pays significantly
less for healthcare than it would without an exemption, and in a corporate world where
companies struggle to gain even the tiniest margins of advantage over competitors, it is
quite plausible that ambitious companies could claim exemptions to gain economic
advantage.
This is, of course, pure speculation. But if there is one thing that the last 25 years
of accommodationist debate and then practice should teach us, it is that
accommodationism has the potential to develop in unpredictable directions. As the
ACLU’s Nadine Strossen said in support of RFRA at its 1992 hearings, “precisely the
advantage of this kind of neutrally written statute is you can't sort of calculate it in
advance who is going to be benefited and whose ox is going to be gored.”365 Current
RFRA proponents should take heed of Strossen’s statement. She did not foresee her ox
getting gored, but nobody ever does.
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